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PRICING DISINTERMEDIATION:
CROWDFUNDING AND ONLINE
AUCTION IPOS
Christine Hurt*
Recently, the concept of crowdfunding has reignited a desire
among both entrepreneurs and investors to harness technology to as-
sist smaller issuers in the funding of their business ventures. Like the
online auction IPO of the previous decade, equity crowdfunding
promises both to disintermediate capital raising and democratize re-
tail investing. In addition, crowdfunding could make capital raising
more accessible to small issuers than any type of IPO or private offer-
ing. Until the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
("JOBS Act") in 2012, however, crowdfunding sites operated in a
netherworld of uncertain regulation. In this crowdfunding Wild West,
various types of entrepreneurs raised monies in various ways, some in
obvious violation of the Federal Securities Acts.
The passage of Title III of the JOBS Act, the Capital Raising
Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act
("CROWDFUND" Act) seemed to bless the attempts of crowdfund-
ing pioneers in the area of capital raising. The statutory language,
however, does not exempt early entrants' efforts; instead, it provides a
mechanism for future attempts to qualify for an exemption. The pro-
posed Regulation Crowdfunding leaves little doubt that crowdfunding
will not be easy: disclosure requirements, portal registration, and
capital limitations are just a few of the costly burdens added to this
would-be alternative. Even if crowdfunding may not be the optimal
path for startups with an ultimate goal of a successful IPO, though,
crowdfunding may be useful for other types of for-profit ventures.
Regardless of the future of the SEC regulations, the legal charitable
crowdfunding of donations will be unaffected and will continue to in-
crease in popularity and acceptance. With the growth of charitable
crowdfunding, for-profit social entrepreneurship may find equity
crowdfunding both appealing and available as an attractive alterna-
* Rex J. & Maureen E. Rawlinson Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University. The author would like to thank helpful assistance from Joan Heminway, Haskell
Murray, Steven Bradford, and participants at the July 2013 Crowdfunding conference at the Leeds
School of Business, University of Colorado-Boulder, participants at the May 2013 Law and Society
Annual Conference, and workshop participants at BYU Law School.
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tive to private equity financing, which may be tempting but may also
lead to mission drift and loss of founder control.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, the explosion of the Internet promised to democ-
ratize the capital markets, increasing both access to capital for new com-
panies and access to investments in initial public offerings to retail inves-
tors. One innovation born of this opportunity was the online auction
initial public offering ("IPO"), an alternative to the traditional book-
building method of underwriting IPOs that allocates IPO shares to val-
ued customers of the underwriters, often at a discount to market value.2
The promised magic of the online IPO, however, was never realized.3
Though several large investment banks were granted permission to host
online IPOs through no-action letters by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC")4 and many created online auction platforms, only
one investment bank, W.R. Hambrecht + Co., commercialized such a
platform for public offerings of equity securities.' Moreover, one of the
largest IPOs of this millennium, the Google IPO, was characterized as an
online auction IPO,6 but few others have followed in the wake of
Google's shaky launch. The roughly twenty auction IPO issuers may
have avoided Wall Street underpricing and preferential allocations, but
they also forewent Wall Street salesmanship' and analyst research.' With
a loss of less than one percent of IPOs to the auction IPO format, the
death of the expensive bookbuilding method was much exaggerated.
1. See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 711,
769 (2005) ("The availability of online IPO auction mechanisms promise a much more democratic IPO
process whereby the larger public has the opportunity to participate.").
2. See Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Pref-
erential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 583, 594 (2004) ("By grant-
ing highly profitable IPO allocations to savvy business-people who well understand that nothing in this
world is free, underwriters can expect real returns on their investment in goodwill.").
3. See Mark Lewis, Online IPO Revolution Postponed, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2001), http://www.
forbes.com/2001/03/14/0314banks.html (reporting that Walter Cruttenden, CEO of E*Offering, had
predicted that by 2002, "80% of IPOs would be completed online").
4. The first no-action letter issued by the SEC to an underwriter purporting to offer equity
shares in an initial public auction was to Wit Capital in 1999, and it allowed online auctions in IPOs,
though technically SEC rules concerning the timing of offers and sales of securities did not correspond
with an ongoing bidding mechanism. See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1999 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,577 at 78,906 (July 14,1999).
5. See About WR Hambrecht + Co., WR HAMBRECHT + CO., www.wrhambrecht.com/about
(last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
6. See Op-Ed., Review & Outlook: Google's Dutch Treat, WALL ST. J., May 3,2004, at A20.
7. See Christine Hurt, What Google Can't Tell Us About Internet Auctions (And What It Can),
37 U. TOL. L. REV. 403, 428 (2006) [hereinafter Hurt, Google] ("Auction opponents criticized
Google's confusing auction and managerial missteps for destroying much of the value that could have
been captured in the IPO and depressing the price. Critics blamed Google both for alienating institu-
tional investors and for scaring away retail investors."); see also Mark Calvey, IPO Rebel Defies Wall
Street, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2005/01/
31/story2.html?page=all (quoting Thomas Weisel, CEO of Thomas Weisel Partners (one of Google's
underwriters) as saying the Google auction was a failure because only two legitimate institutional in-
vestors participated in the instant auction).
8. See Christine Hurt, Initial Public Offerings and the Failed Promise of Disintermediation, 2
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J.703, 735-37 (2008) [hereinafter Hurt, Disintermediation] (positing that
issuers attempting to yield one hundred percent of market value (X) instead of eighty-two percent of
X in a bookbuilding IPO instead yielded one hundred percent of X less the added value of a Wall
Street underwriter (Z), and that .82(X-Z) is greater than 1(X)).
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Recently, the concept of crowdfunding has reignited a desire among
both entrepreneurs and investors to harness technology to assist smaller
issuers in the funding of their business ventures. Like the online auction
IPO, equity crowdfunding promises both to disintermediate capital rais-
ing and democratize retail investing. In addition, crowdfunding could
make capital raising more accessible to small issuers than any type of
IPO or private offering. Until the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act ("JOBS Act") in 2012,9 however, crowdfunding sites oper-
ated in a netherworld of uncertain regulation. In this crowdfunding Wild
West, various types of entrepreneurs raised monies in various ways, some
in obvious violation of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act").
Many of those raising funds were individuals or small groups of individu-
als, requesting funding for projects ranging from artistic endeavors to
philanthropic causes to commercial inventions. Platforms emerged to of-
fer templates and traffic, such as Kickstarter, RocketHub, and Indiegogo.
Some fundraisers were registered not-for-profit corporations; some were
registered corporate entities such as corporations or limited liability
companies; most were individuals or unincorporated groups. Some fund-
raisers promised rewards or preordered products; some promised return
of principal; some promised returns on principal; some promised nothing.
For entrepreneurs looking to raise startup capital, crowdfunding
was attractive but dangerous. The riskiest incentive for crowdfunding en-
trepreneurs to offer funders was interest on principal or an equity
stake-the two models most likely to raise the attention of the SEC as
the offer or sale of securities without the benefit of registration.', Though
commercial ventures could offer funders a different incentive, such as
early delivery of a proposed product, such a model necessarily limited
the amount of funds that could be raised. Some portals, such as Pro-
Founder, Prosper, and Lending Club, purported to give entrepreneurs an
easy and legal way to crowdfund equity capital or interest-bearing loans;
however, regulatory scrutiny caught up with those skirting the securities
laws."
The passage of Title III of the JOBS Act, the Capital Raising
Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act
("CROWDFUND Act") 2 seemed to bless the attempts of crowdfunding
pioneers in the area of capital raising, at least in theory. The statutory
9. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). The JOBS
Act is a package of legislation designed to spur economic growth through loosening regulations on
capital formation by small businesses. The creative acronym points to the argument that most new jobs
are created by new small businesses. See Spurring Job Growth, Through Capital Formation, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of
Timothy Rowe, CEO, Cambridge Innovation Center) [hereinafter Rowe Testimony] (citing statistics
that for every job lost by firms six years old or older, firms less than six years old created three).
10. These types of returns constitute "securities" under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act. 15
U.S.C. § 77(b) (2012). See infra Section IV.A (detailing the securities laws implicated by the sale of
"shares," "investment contracts," and "notes" without registration).
11. See infra Section IV.A (describing the fates of various investor crowdfunding sites).
12. CROWDFUND Act, Pub. L. No. 112-116, 126 Stat. 306 §§ 301-305 (2012) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
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language, however, does not exempt early entrants' efforts; instead, it
merely provides a mechanism for future crowdfunding attempts to quali-
fy for an exemption." Even with proposed SEC rules nearing finaliza-
tionl4 the question remains-which types of entrepreneurs and funding
models will survive and thrive under a new crowdfunding regime? The
statutory provisions of the JOBS Act leave little doubt that crowdfund-
ing will not be easy: disclosure requirements, portal registration, and cap-
ital limitations are just a few of the details that may not be substantially
alleviated by the SEC in regulations." The most optimistic commentators
hope that crowdfunding eases access to capital markets for promising
for-profit ventures, creating a new step in the life cycle of a startup:
friends and family funding, crowdfunding, angel investing, venture capi-
tal ("VC"), and then IPO. On the other hand, critics predict that crowd-
funding will go the way of the online auction, an unnecessarily compli-
cated mechanism that stigmatizes those issuers who try to sidestep
traditional Wall Street intermediaries.
Even if crowdfunding may not be the optimal path for startups with
an ultimate goal of a successful IPO, crowdfunding may be useful for
other types of for-profit ventures. Regardless of the future of the SEC
regulations, the legal, charitable crowdfunding of donations will be unaf-
fected and will continue to increase in popularity and acceptance. With
the growth of charitable crowdfunding, for-profit social entrepreneurship
may find equity crowdfunding both appealing and available. For-profit
social entrepreneurs may be able to use the crowdfunding vehicle to
brand themselves as prosocial, attracting individual and institutional
cause investors who may operate outside of traditional capital markets
and may look for intangible returns. Just as charitable crowdfunders re-
but the conventional wisdom that donors expect tax deductibility, proso-
cial equity crowdfunders may rebut the conventional wisdom that early
equity investors expect high returns or an exit mechanism. This avenue
may be an attractive alternative to private equity financing, which may
be tempting but may also lead to mission drift and loss of founder con-
trol.16
13. In fact, the mere passage of the Act exempting crowdfunding meeting the new requirements
implicitly condemned existing investor crowdfunding. See JOBS Act Implementation: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of James J. Angel, Assoc. Prof.,
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University) [hereinafter Angel Testimony] (describing
how passage of the Act instantly signaled that crowdfunding was illegal until such time as the SEC
adopted proposed rules, which experienced substantial delay).
14. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation CrowdfundingJ. Comments on the
proposed regulations were open for ninety days. As of this writing, the rules have not been amended
or made final.
15. See infra Section V (describing the restrictions in both the statute and the regulations, and
the criticisms of them).
16. See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and Bene-
fit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 1, 22-24 (2012) (discussing the potential of benefit cor-
poration statutes to remedy the plight of social entrepreneurs who wish to take on outside capital but
not at the cost of mission drift); Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate
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Part II of this Article will briefly describe the allure and origins of
internet crowdfunding. Part III will chronicle the history and current
state of online auction IPOs. Part IV will provide a background of the le-
gal crowdfunding landscape prior to passage of the JOBS Act, drawing
on the scholarship of others who have been drawing the parameters of
future investor crowdfunding under the JOBS Act and early glimpses of
SEC regulation implementing those crowdfunding provisions. Part V dis-
cusses the legal avenues for crowdfunding under the JOBS Act. Part VI
will explore theories that investor crowdfunding may fail, either because
of regulatory cost, capital structure, or negative signaling to the market.
This Part will also discuss how, by liberalizing other private placement
safe harbors, Congress may have made crowdfunding less necessary or
attractive for some companies. In addition, the predicted failure of equity
crowdfunding will be compared to the realized failure of the online auc-
tion IPO format. Finally, Part VII will propose that the success of donor
charitable crowdfunding and its implications for prosocial enterprises
and "low-profit" corporations.
II. CROWDFUNDING AND THE PROMISE OF DISINTERMEDIATION
A. Crowdsourcing and Crowdfunding
Though the SEC did not issue crowdfunding regulations until 2013,
crowdfunding by that time had already become a well-known avenue for
funding projects ranging from musical recordings, theater performances,
theater preservation, dance performances, documentaries, and films to
new products, video games, and phone/tablet applications. Crowdfunding
is a familiar concept within a larger umbrella of crowdsourcing, which is
an open call to the public to provide information or monies for a cause or
project. At its most general level, pledge drives for public radio stations 7
and charity telethons"8 are time-honored examples of crowdsourcing for
funds over radio or television, but the advent of global connectivity via
the Internet has fueled a revolution for crowdsourcing not just funds, but
information and political support. Endeavors such as Wikipedia are ex-
Law and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 211-12 (2010) (chronicling the sale of
Ben & Jerry's ice cream company).
17. See JACK W. MITCHELL, LISTENER SUPPORTED: THE CULTURE AND HISTORY OF PUBLIC
RADIO 165-66 (2005) (relating the rise of donation drives for public radio stations to the Reagan
budget cuts of the early 1980s).
18. See David Johnston & Jennifer Leonard, TV Charities: Let the Giver Beware, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-01-20/entertainment/ca-10627_1_tv-charity (chronicling
the rise of telethons from the first hosted by United Cerebral Palsy in 1951, which raised $276,408, to
1985, in which seven national and more than fifty regional or local telethons were broadcast). From
1972 to 1983, the Democratic National Committee hosted several national telethons to raise campaign
contributions. Democrats Say "Jamming" by GOP Hurt Telethon, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1983, http://
www.nytimes.com/1983/05/30/us/democrats-say-jamrning-by-gop-hurt-telethon.html (reporting that
ninety percent of calls in the first few hours were "hostile" calls from Republican party members);
John W. Elwood & Robert Spitzer, The Democratic National Telethons: Their Successes and Failures,
41 J. OF POL. 828, 830 (1979) (listing net profits of four telethons in the 1970s as ranging from a high of
$1.9 million in 1972 to a low of $909,771 in 1975).
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amples of crowdsourcing of information." MoveOn.org reinvented polit-
ical fundraising by using the Internet to mobilize younger voters and
their dollars.20 Change.org crowdsources signatures and attention for in-
ternet petitions sent to corporations, politicians, and others.2 1 Disaster
websites asking for donations for groups, such as One Fund Boston, or
for particular victims of the Boston Marathon bombing tragedy, are
crowdsourcing compensation for tort victims.2 Donations by mobile
phone texting have also changed disaster relief.2 DonorsChoose lets po-
tential donors choose among ideas from public school teachers near and
far.24 Small donations from many individuals source the success of these
projects. 25
But online platforms do not solely have to be used as a way to min-
imize transaction costs to solicit donations for traditional causes and
charities. Razoo 26 and StartSomeGood 7 are websites that focus on newer
or smaller nonprofits and social entrepreneurs, many of which would not
be able to raise funds without an internet platform. Soon, website portals
such as Kickstarter,1 RocketHub, 29 and IndieGoGo 0 emerged to provide
19. See Eric Goldman, Wikipedia's Labor Squeeze and its Consequences, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 157, 158 (2010) ("The Internet allows geographically dispersed individuals to voluntar-
ily contribute their time and expertise towards socially productive tasks. Wikipedia is a shining exam-
ple of this phenomenon."); Beth Simone Noveck, Wikipedia and the Future of Legal Education, 57 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 4 (2007) (explaining how "wikis" are used and the collaborative editing software on
which wikis are based).
20. What is Move On?, MOVEONORG, http://front.moveon.org/about/#.VAiS8GSWx74 (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014). See Nathaniel J. Gleicher, Moneybombs and Democratic Participation: Regulat-
ing Fundraising by Online Intermediaries, 70 MD. L. REv. 750, 766--67 (2011) (describing the creation
of MoveOn.org in 1998, as well as the creation of other online independent fundraising groups such as
FreedomWorks).
21. About Change.org, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/about (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
See Nicholas D. Kristof, After Recess: Change the World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/02/05/opinion/sunday/kristof-after-recess-change-the-world.html (describing suc-
cessful Change.org petitions by children and other average individuals that caused large corporations
to change policies). Causes.com, run by a for-profit corporation, also hosts petitions and allows users
to raise money for causes. CAUSES.COM, https://www.causes.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
22. See Christine Hurt, One Fund Boston, Torts and Social Capital, CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 23,
2013), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/04/one-fund-boston-torts-and-social-capital.html.
23. See Suzanne Martindale & Gail Hillebrand, Pay at Your Own Risk? How to Make Every
Way to Pay Safe for Mobile Payments, 27 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 265, 270 (recounting how the
American Red Cross raised $5 million in forty-eight hours through SMS (short message service) mo-
bile phone texts after the 2010 hurricane in Haiti).
24. See Ryan Mac, DonorsChoose's Charles Best: Pioneering Citizen Philanthropy, FORBES
(Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/20l2/09/18/donorschooses-charles-best-
pioneering-citizen-philanthropy/ (describing the creation of DonorsChoose.org by a young history
teacher, who can now count Oprah Winfrey and Stephen Colbert among his board members).
25. Other websites that offer fundraising platforms for soliciting donations are Fundly.com,
GoGetFunding.com, and Crowdrise.com. FUNDLY.COM, https://fundly.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014);
GoGETFUNDING.COM, http://gogetfunding.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); CROWDRISE.COM, https://
www.crowdrise.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). CauseWish.com is a website for soliciting donations
for personal medical costs. CAUSEWISH.COM, http://causewish.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
26. RAzoo, www.razoo.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). Razoo also allows individuals to fund-
raise for personal causes. Why individuals Love Razoo, RAZOO, www.razoo.com/p/for-individuals
(last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
27. STARTSOMEGOOD, www.startsomegood.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). StartSomeGood
divides causes into eleven categories, ranging from Art & Culture to Human Rights. Id.
28. KICKSTARTER, www.kickstarter.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
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platforms for individuals and groups to ask the public to fund various
types of projects, from artistic to altruistic to technology-related projects.
According to statistics updated daily on its website, Kickstarter, the lead-
ing crowdfunding platform, has featured 169,845 projects, of which
40.06%, or 68,048, have been successfully funded, as of August 2014.1'
Over 6.8 million "backers" have pledged to projects, and over 2 million
are repeat backers. 32 In all, the projects have attracted 17,166,433 pledges
since 2009.33 Over all platforms, an estimated $3 billion was crowdfunded
in 2012.3
B. Disintermediation by the Crowd
Crowdfunding has the potential to disrupt early stage equity invest-
ing in the same way that auction IPOs promised to subvert the book-
building paradigm. In traditional IPOs, underwriters have significant
control over pricing, allocation, and underwriting fees. The auction IPO
attempted to reduce costs and democratize the distribution to retail in-
vestors. Likewise, the angel investing industry and venture capital indus-
try have their own inherent biases. Early round investing depends greatly
on networks and geography;" almost all startup companies with VC
funding were founded by men and led by men. 6 Crowdfunding can elim-
inate these biases and democratize both the investing side, allowing retail
investors to participate in early stage investing, and also the entrepreneur
side, giving access to capital to a wider range of founders." Just as auc-
29. ROCKETHUB, www.rockethub.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
30. INDIEGOGO, www.indiegogo.com (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
31. Stats, KiCKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=footer (last visited Oct. 20,
2014).
32. Id.
3P. Id.
34. See David Zvilichovsky et al., Playing Both Sides of the Market: Success and Reciprocity on
Crowdfunding Platforms 2 (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper No. 2304101, 2013)
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2304101 (2013); Anita Hamilton, How to Crowdfund Your Crea-
tive Project, TIME (Oct. 22, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/10/22/how-to-crowdfund-your-
creative-project/slide/introduction/ (citing estimates that $3 billion would be crowdfunded in 2012,
twice the $1.5 billion raised in 2011).
35. See Rowe Testimony, supra note 9 (testifying as to the uneven distribution of risk capital
across regions of the United States); Equity Finance: Catalyst for Small Business Growth Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on the Economic Growth, Tax, and Capital Access of the H. Comm. on Small Bus.,
112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Jason W. Best, Cofounder, Startup Exemption) (giving as examples
entrepreneurs in Natchitoches, Louisiana or Arnold, Nebraska who may not have access to angel in-
vestors but have great ideas); Ethan Mollick, Swept Away By the Crowd? Crowdfunding, Venture Cap-
ital, and the Selection of Entrepreneurs 8 (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper 2239204,
2013), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2239204 [hereinafter Mollick, Selection] (citing stud-
ies that show that the average distance between a venture capital firm and an entrepreneur is seventy
miles).
36. See Mollick, Selection, supra note 35 (citing evidence that 6% of venture capital funding goes
to companies with a female CEO, and only 1.3% to companies with a female founder or cofounder,
compared with a population of companies in which females constitute 40% of business owners).
37. See Ajay Agrawal et al., The Geography of Crowdfunding, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16820, 2011) (studying the Amsterdam portal Sellaband and noting that the aver-
age distance between the crowdfunder and the project owner was 3000 miles); Mollick, Selection, su-
pra note 35, at 16 (noting in the author's crowdfunding sample, gender was not predictive).
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tion IPOs were an alternative to pricey investment banks, crowdfunding
could be an alternative to angel investing and venture capital investing
that can cost founders managerial control. Before focusing attention on
the regulatory concerns related to crowdfunding, a brief history of the
online auction IPO may be instructive.
III. THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF THE ONLINE IPO
A. The Bookbuilding IPO
Corporations (and other types of for-profit entities) seeking equity
capital beyond the capital of existing shareholders have few options for
legal capital-raising. Selling equity (and debt) securities is highly regulat-
ed by the SEC, and the Securities Act provides a costly and complicated
structure for selling securities to the public. SEC regulations provide var-
ious avenues for privately placing securities with investors in nonpublic
offerings, but there is only one pathway to harness the capital-raising po-
tential of an initial public offering: share registration under the Securities
Act. IPOs raise capital for the issuer and create liquidity for early share-
holders, but they also entail a lengthy and expensive registration process
and lock in the issuer to mandatory periodic disclosures with the SEC.38
The registration process also submits the issuer to the antifraud provi-
sions of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act").
Another aspect of the IPO process that increases the cost of capital
raising is the distribution method employed by the underwriters of the
offering. In the United States, the near-exclusive method of distributing
shares in an IPO is the bookbuilding method. In this method, the under-
writer seeks indications of interest from large, institutional investors and
other wealthy investors concerning the number of shares that an investor
might purchase at certain prices. This information gathering happens
during the registration waiting period, often at road shows or at individu-
al face-to-face meetings. Though regulations limit the distribution of
written information that issuers may provide investors during the regis-
tration process, oral communications are unregulated, giving increased
information to investors with personal access to the issuer or underwrit-
ers. As the registration of the shares becomes effective, the underwriter
allocates IPO shares to institutional investors, regular individual custom-
ers, persons on the issuer's "friends and family list," and other individu-
als at the discretion of the underwriter.3 9 Through this bookbuilding pro-
cess, the vast majority of the original IPO shares will be distributed to
38. See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the
Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 181-84 (2013) (discussing the
negative repercussions of costly disclosure for all firms with registered securities).
39. See Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO -Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as
Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2023, 2031 (2002) ("In general, the lead underwriter's decision as to
how to allocate the shares of an IPO is not subject to substantive regulation under the terms of either
the 1933 or 1934 Acts.").
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known investors through the underwriters.40 Retail investors, then, pur-
chase the shares that these recipients sell in the first few hours of the IPO
and the small number of shares that were not allocated.4 1
In "hot" IPO markets, underwriters may have an incentive to "un-
derprice" IPO shares, knowing that allocating underpriced shares to its
customers has the effect of giving investors prepackaged profit. 42 IPO re-
cipients can then sell these underpriced shares at market prices on the
first day, pocketing the difference.4 1 Underwriters may use this ability to
strengthen relationships with potential, new, or favored customers.4
Many have suggested more legitimate reasons for underpricing-
marketing strategy,45 lowering liability risk," compensating for under-
writer liability risk,47 assisting a firm-commitment offering,48 compensat-
ing institutional investors for price discovery,49 placing shares with long
40. See Reena Aggarwal et al., Institutional Allocation in Initial Public Offerings: Empirical Evi-
dence, 57 J. OF FIN. 1421, 1430 (2002) (stating that institutional investors receive approximately seven-
ty-five percent of all original IPO shares).
41. See Beatrice Boehmer et al., Do Institutions Receive Favorable Allocations in IPOs with Bet-
ter Long Run Returns?, 41 J. OF FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 809, 814 (2006) (stating that in their
sample, seventy-nine percent of the shares in the IPOs were allocated by the underwriter).
42. See Francois Derrien & Kent L. Womack, Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of Un-
derpricing in Hot IPO Markets, 16 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 31, 31 (2013) (concluding that in hot markets,
underpricing of IPO shares can be "double-digit" or "triple-digit"); Jay Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review
of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795, 1816 (2002) (stating that between 1980-1997,
IPO shares had offering prices fifty percent higher than the share prices of comparable publicly-held
companies with similar fundamentals).
43. See In re eBay, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 23, 2004) ("For these services, eBay has paid Goldman Sachs over $8 million. During this same
time period, Goldman Sachs 'rewarded' the individual defendants by allocating to them thousands of
IPO shares, managed by Goldman Sachs, at the initial offering price. Because the IPO market during
this particular period of time was extremely active, prices of initial stock offerings often doubled or
tripled in a single day. Investors who were well connected, either to Goldman Sachs or to similarly
situated investment banks serving as IPO underwriters, were able to flip these investments into instant
profit by selling the equities in a few days or even in a few hours after they were initially purchased.").
44. See id. The eBay case interestingly involved shareholders alleging a breach of fiduciary duty
against officers of a Goldman Sachs client that accepted IPO shares that were instantly profitable be-
cause the profit belonged to the corporation. Id. Other lawsuits attempting to litigate underwriter allo-
cations were largely unsuccessful, though one class action lawsuit alleging series of various IPO abuses
was defended vigorously for a decade before settling. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F.
Supp. 2d 281, 293, 295-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (partial denial of motion to dismiss); 671 F. Supp. 2d 467,
470 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (preliminary approval of settlement).
45. See HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 248 (2000) (hypothesizing that investment banks underprice
issues to create demand for the purpose of motivating investors to form a "bandwagon").
46. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings
Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 24-26 (arguing that because securities fraud lawsuits require
evidence of price drops and because damages are calculated based on that drop that underpricing mit-
igates both litigation risk and liability amounts).
47. See id. at 47.
48. But see Ritter & Welch, supra note 42, at 1807 (providing the counterargument that this the-
ory is weak because underpricing is more severe in hot IPO markets when shares are easiest to sell).
49. See Ann E. Sherman & Sheridan Titman, Building the IPO Order Book: Underpricing and
Participation Limits with Costly Information, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4, 20 (2002); see also Ritter & Welch,
supra note 42, at 1805.
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term investors50-but allocation abuses during hot IPO markets have
been well-documented.
In the last hot IPO market in the late 1990s, underpricing happened
frequently" and spurred a sentiment that issuers were leaving large
amounts of capital on the table that was enriching intermediaries, 5 2 but
not issuers' coffers." One way to avoid underpricing would be to. avoid
the bookbuilding process by creating an online auction.
B. The Birth of the Online IPO Auction
If the primary justifications of IPO underpricing are information
discovery and an effective distribution, then technology promised a
cheaper solution than the bookbuilding process. An online IPO auction,
used in other countries to some success,5 4 seemed like a revolution for the
retail investor. In the purest form of online auction, the underwriter has
little to no discretion in determining either the price of the IPO shares or
the recipients of the distribution. The resulting offering price is the high-
est price at which all shares are sold, reflecting full demand for the IPO
shares. Once the initial shares are sold, then secondary trading takes
place on an exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
or the NASDAQ. Because the auction captured the highest price at
which bidders offered to purchase the shares, the share price should not
rise appreciably in the first few days. The result should be that issuers
raise more capital in an online auction IPO than in a bookbuilding IPO.
Assuming average underpricing of eighteen percent,5 theoretically an
online auction IPO should yield an issuer $100 million for the same offer-
ing in which a bookbuilding IPO would generate $82 million.
In 1999 and 2000, multiple investment banks applied and received
permission from the SEC to use Internet auctions for the distribution of
50. See A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting "Truth in Securities" Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harness-
ing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 999, 1014 (2013).
51. See, e.g., Debra Baker, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, 86 A.B.A. J. 36, 36-37 (2000) (re-
porting that VA Linux Systems, Inc. stock was priced at $30 per share, then closed on the first day of
trading at more than $239 per share); Devra Vrana, California Dealin': In Both Price and Volume, IP-
Os End 1999 with a Bang, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1999, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/27/
business/fi-47884 (reporting that IPO shares in 1999 jumped an average of sixty-seven percent on the
first day, and for California firms, the average first-day pop was ninety-eight percent).
52. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The IPO Allocation Probe: Who is the Victim, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18,
2001, at 5 (describing as dysfunctional an IPO system that sees up to seventy-five percent of the mar-
ket value of the IPO shares going to either underwriters or institutional investors and not the issuer).
53. Generally, IPO shares do not do well over the first few years of trading, but underpriced IPO
shares do even worse, contributing to a theory that issuers lost much-needed capital due to underpric-
ing. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum, and Lockup
Expiration Selling, 66 J. FIN. EcoN. 105, 106 (2002); Alexander P. Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Inves-
tor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing, 79 J. Bus. 1667, 1690 (2006) (showing that companies with first-day
returns over sixty percent have the worst one-year returns of all issuers in the same year); Ritter &
Welch, supra note 42, at 1817 (concluding that IPO shares have negative three year returns and per-
form 23.4% worse than the average market portfolio over the same time period).
54. Hurt, Google, supra note 7, at 408-09.
55. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 42, at 1795.
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IPO shares in online auctions." These no-action letters were necessary
because in an online auction, both the bidders and the issuer would need
to be bound to the submitted bids before the price of the shares was set
by the auction mechanism; in a registered offering under the Securities
Act, no offers to purchase or sell may be made or accepted until the reg-
istration statement, including the set price, is declared effective." In an
online auction, technology would, in effect, disintermediate IPOs, shift-
ing both pricing and allocation power from underwriters to the issuer.
Not only would issuers be able to sell their shares at a higher price, but
the process would be democratized. Retail investors would be able to
purchase at the market price," not at a bandwagon price created by un-
derpricing. By January 2000, "about a dozen" investment firms had cre-
ated online systems to distribute IPOs and thirty-eight percent of all
IPOs in the last half of 1999 had an online component combined with a
traditional bookbuilding IPO. 9 Three full-fledged online IPOs were also
conducted in 1999.6
Even so, the second half of 2000 signaled a cooling of the IPO mar-
ket. The general reluctance of Wall Street to embrace the online IPO,
combined with the decline of the U.S. economy, did not encourage the
fledgling online IPO industry. Only one investment bank commercialized
and maintained an online IPO auction platform: W.R. Hambrecht + Co. 6 '
56. See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 49854 (July 14, 1999) [hereinafter
Wit Capital, 1999 Letter]; WR Hambrecht + Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 987735 (July 12,
2000) (approving online auctions for distribution of registered debt securities); Bear, Stearns & Co.,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1013584 (July 20, 2000) (describing Bear, Steams' Dutch Auc-
tion internet Syndication System ("DAiSS") for registered debt securities); Wit Capital Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1013585 (July 20, 2000) [hereinafter Wit Capital, 2000 Letter] (stating the
auction will be used for follow-on, secondary, and combination offerings).
57. The Wit Capital letters described various ways to fine-tune the online auction, including giv-
ing bidders a range of prices approved by the SEC, then accepting conditional bids within that range.
If not enough customers bid for shares at even the minimum price then the minimum price would be
the share price and the issuer would sell all the shares to the underwriter at the price under a firm
commitment underwriting. If bids at the share price exceeded the number of shares available, the issu-
er would allocate the shares to the bidders based strictly on the highest price bid by the bidder and the
time of the bid. See Wit Capital, 2000 Letter, supra note 56, at *7-9. The 1999 Wit Capital Letter re-
served the right of the issuer to require the underwriter to set aside "a specified number of shares in an
offering for certain categories of employees or customers of the issuer or other person with an affinity
relationship with the issuer." See Wit Capital, 1999 Letter, supra note 56, at *12.
58. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, After Years Without Change, Cracks Appear in IPO. Process,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 15, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/after-years-without-
change-cracks-appear-in-i-p-o-process/ (noting that one advantage to the auction model is "[i]t brings
retail investors back into the process because they can freely bid on issues" instead of subsidizing first-
day gains).
59. See Laura S. Unger, Commissioner, SEC, Technology and Regulation: The Road Ahead,
Address at the San Diego Securities Institute (Jan. 27, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/spch343.htm.
60. See Superior Results for Companies We Are Proud to Call Our Clients, WR HAMBRECHT +
Co., www.wrhambrecht.com/clients (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
61. Hambrecht + Co. was launched in 1998 by Bill Hambrecht, a former investment banker at
his own firm, Hambrecht + Quist. See Joe Nocera, Open and Fair: Why Wall St. Hates Auctions, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2006, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990DEOD91E31F93BA25750
COA9609C8B63 (quoting Hambrecht as saying that when he started auctions at the age of sixty-two, "I
honestly thought that the abuses in the I.P.O. market were becoming so obvious that other firms
would follow us"); see also Christian Berthelsen, Investment Banker Fights the System: Plan for Cutting
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In the fourteen years since 2000, Hambrecht has hosted a mere twenty
online IPOs.6 2
TABLE 1
Issuer Name Date of Size of Offer- Offering Closing Percent
IPO ing Price Price Change
Truett-Hurst, 6/19/2013 $16,200,000 $6.00 $5.80 -3.333
Inc.
Rackspace 8/08/2008 $187,500,000 $12.50 $10.01 -19.920
Hosting, Inc.
NetSuite Inc. 12/20/2007 $161,200,000 $26.00 $35.50 36.538
Clean Energy 5/25/2007 $120,000,000 $12.00 $12.04 0.333
Fuels Corp.
Interactive Bro- 5/4/2007 $1,200,400,000 $30.01 $31.30 4.298
kers Group, Inc.
FortuNet, Inc. 1/31/2006 $22,500,000 $9.00 $9.05 0.555
Traffic.com, Inc. 1/25/2006 $78,600,000 $12.00 $12.01 0.083
Dover Saddlery, 11/17/2005 $27, 500,000 $10.00 $10.25 2.500
Inc.
Avalon Pharma- 9/28/2005 $28,875,000 $10.50 $9.49 -9.619
ceuticals, Inc.
CryoCor, Inc. 7/14/2005 $40,799,990 $11.00 $10.87 -1.181
Morningstar, 5/2/2005 $140,831,250 $18.50 $20.05 8.378
Inc.
BofI Holding, 3/15/2005 $35,100,001 $11.50 $11.50 0.000
Inc.
Google Inc. 8/18/2004 $1,666,429,400 $85.00 $100.34 18.047
IPO Conflicts Gets Attention, but Wall Street Dubious, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2002, http://www.sfgate.
com/business/article/Investment-banker-fights-the-system-Plan-for-2794048.php(describing Open IPO
as "an alternative open-bidding process modeled on Dutch flower auctions to eliminate secretive IPO
pricing strategies and what many experts consider allocation favoritism").
62. Superior Results for Companies We Are Proud to Call Our Clients, WR HAMBRECHT +
Co., https://www.wrhambrecht.com/clients/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). This number overstates the
case somewhat in that it includes the Google IPO, which was actually not hosted by Hambrecht, but by
Morgan Stanley. Paul R. La Monica, Google Sets $2.7 Billion IPO, CNN MONEY (Apr. 30, 2004),
http://money.cnn.com/2004/04/29/technology/google/.
63. Truett-Hurst, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Mar. 11, 2013), available at http://
www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=8744846. According to Truett-Hurst, Inc.'s Form S-
1, William R. Hambrecht is a director of Truett-Hurst and a major investor through Hambrecht Wine
Group, L.P. Id. In addition, Truett-Hurst leases land and buildings from Hambrecht Wine Group as
well as vineyards from Hambrecht Trust. Id. The Truett-Hurst IPO was criticized for raising only $14
million in capital, though costing over $2 million in fees. See Paul Franson, Truett Hurst Goes Public at
Reduced Value, WINES AND VINES (June 26, 2013), http://www.winesandvines.com/template.cfm?
section=news&content=1 18483.
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New River 8/5/2004 $33,600,000 $8.00 $7.50 -6.250
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Genitope 10/30/2003 $33,300,000 $9.00 $10.00 -11.111
Corporation
RedEnvelope, 9/25/2003 $30,800,000 $14.00 $14.55 3.928
Inc.
Overstock.com 5/29/2002 $39,000,000 $13.00 $13.03 0.231
Briazz, Inc. 5/2/2001 $16,000,000 $8.00 $8.03 0.375
Peet's Coffee 1/25/2001 $26,400,000 $8.00 $9.38 17.250
& Tea
Nogatech, Inc. 5/17/2000 $42,000,000 $12.00 $9.41 -21.583
Andover.net 12/8/1999 $82,800,000 $18.00 $63.38 252.111
Salon.com 6/22/1999 $27,300,000 $10.50 $10.00 -5.000
Ravenswood 4/9/1999 $11,550,000 $10.50 $10.88 3.600
Though very few companies have chosen the online auction route to
IPO," the auction mechanism has been successful in reducing the under-
pricing phenomenon of the average bookbuilding IPO. Some commenta-
tors point to the average first-day pop of all twenty-three auction IPOs
and conclude that the auction does not significantly reduce underpric-
ing. ' This set of issuers, however, contains one outlier IPO, Andover.net,
which had a 252.08% first-day share price increase in 1999.6 Omitting
that observation yields an average first-day increase among auction IPOs
of .725%.7 If the Google auction, which was run by Morgan Stanley, is
omitted, the average first-day pop is -. 01%.6 The median first-day pop of
all twenty-three auctions is .333%.69 If the goal of the online auction is to
64. According to Professor Jay Ritter, 1568 operating companies went public in the United
States between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2012. See JAY RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS:
UPDATED STATISTICS 12 (2013), http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/lPOs2Ol2Statistics.pdf. In addi-
tion, the aggregate dollar version of capital raised in all IPOs between January 1, 2001, and December
31, 2012, was $315.43 billion, compared with $3.905 billion raised in online IPOs. Id. at 3. Omitting the
Google auction, the aggregate amount of capital raised in the same time period in auctions as $2.239
billion. Id. at 29. By both numbers of offerings and aggregate amount of offerings, auctions appear to
represent approximately one percent of the U.S. IPO market. Id. at 29-30. This percentage may be
exaggerated, however, as it compares the total number of auction IPOs with the number of operating
company IPOs, which omits other types of IPOs, including REITs, SPACs, S&Ls, foreign corporations
already listed elsewhere, and unit trusts. Id. at 2.
65. Peter B. Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 853,885-87 (2007) (arguing
that auction IPOs are not more efficient than bookbuilding because of a 20.3% average first day pop).
66. Ritter, supra note 65, at 29.
67. Id. at 29-30.
68. Id
69. Id.
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reduce the first-day share price increase to zero, then, on average, the
IPO auction is well-suited to that goal.70
C. The Death of the Online Auction IPO
Other than the Truett-Hurst IPO in 2013, Hambrecht + Co. has not
hosted an online auction IPO since 2008. In other words, no issuer that is
not owned by William Hambrecht has chosen an online auction IPO in
over five years, compared to over three hundred thirty bookbuilding
IPOs during that same period." The one IPO that might have been a
turning point for the auction process was Google. The Google IPO, how-
ever, was fraught with legal and technical problems, and ended up being
fairly bad publicity for the auction method.72
The conventional wisdom is that IPO auctions are challenging be-
cause an issuer has to forego a Wall Street investment bank" and the an-
alysts and institutional investors that come with it.74 If IPO shares are
"sold, not bought," then an auction IPO loses out on the selling efforts of
the brand name investment bank.7 1 Venture-capital backed firms in par-
ticular tend to want to stick to cultivated relationships with investment
banks." Besides path dependence, issuers may realize that the value add-
70. Ironically, financial reporters tend to characterize IPOs without a first-day price increase as
disappointing, creating a Catch-22 for auction IPOs. If an online auction IPO has a first-day pop, then
critics argue that the auction is no better than the bookbuilding method. If the online auction IPO
does not have a first-day pop, then the IPO is viewed as unsuccessful. See Phil Wahba, Michaels Heary
Debt Weighs on Market Debt, FORTUNE (June 27, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/06/27/michaels-ipo-
disappointment/.
71. William Hambrecht, head of WR Hambrecht + Co, had a stake in Truett-Hurst at the time it
went public. Telis Demos, A Different Kind of Wine Auction, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT BLOG
(Apr. 17, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/04/17/a-different-kind-of-wine-
auction/. See Hurt, Disintermediation, supra note 8, at 733-34 (describing Google's hybrid model and
its unique attempt to have the Wall Street demand network along with the less costly online IPO).
72. See Hurt, Disintermediation, supra note 8, at 733-36 (describing Google's attempt to com-
bine the demand networks of Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse First Boston with the democratic
branding of the online auction). Many of the noted missteps of Google included (1) initially requiring
bidders to have a Morgan Stanley or CSFB account with a high balance; (2) having a complicated two-
stage bidding process; (3) pricing the issue below the auction "clearing price"; (4) declaring the auction
open in August, prime vacation time for many bidders; (5) encountering legal problems from violating
SEC rules by having too many existing shareholders and giving an interview to Playboy magazine that
was published during the "quiet period." Id. Moreover, institutional investors were said to have boy-
cotted the auction process, only to purchase shares in the aftermarket, causing the price to steadily
increase. See also Hurt, Google, supra note 7, at 425-27.
73. See Jeff Sommer, No Bitter Aftertaste from this Stock Offering, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/your-money/an-ipo-process-that-is-customer-friendly.html?pagew
anted=all&rr=0 (quoting Professor Matthew Rhodes-Kropf of the Harvard Business School as saying
"Wall Street will always hate IPO auctions ... because Wall Street is all about insider access, and these
auctions take it away").
74. See Michael T. Cliff & David J. Denis, Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst
Coverage with Underpricing?, 59 J. OF FIN. 2871, 2898-99 (2004); Laurie Krigman et al., Why Do Firms
Switch Underwriters?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 245, 248-50 (2001).
75. Scott Reeves, Google's Flub, Flop and Bomb, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2004, 6:00AM), http://
www.forbes.com/2004/09/17/cx-sr_0917ipooutlook.html.
76. See Nocera, supra note 61, at 12 (describing situations in which Hambrecht would make a
pitch for the auction IPO to "an independent-minded chief executive who found the egalitarian nature
of the auction appealing" only to have the venture capital investors choose a Wall Street financial firm
to run the IPO instead).
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ed by the investment bank more than compensates for the underpricing
of the bookbuilding method.
Of the issuers that have tried the online IPO method, the long term
share value results are mixed. With only twenty-two or twenty-three is-
suers in the cohort, making generalizations about returns is difficult.
However, of the six issuers that chose an auction IPO following the 2004
Google IPO, none of those issuers currently trade above or even near
their IPO price, if they trade at all.77 Many others have delisted or filed
for bankruptcy. Another piece of evidence that might show a backlash
from established Wall Street demand networks would be analyst cover-
age. For a public company, lack of analyst coverage can artificially de-
press the price of a stock.7 1 In keeping with a hypothesis that auction IPO
firms would have low analyst coverage, of the twelve firms that have not
been acquired or declared bankruptcy, three have no analyst coverage, 79
two have just one analyst each covering its stock,' and one issuer has two
analysts covering its stock." Three high performers have robust analyst
coverage.8 2
77. Four of the issuers were acquired at "fire sale" prices: CryoCor ($1.35/sh); Avalon Pharma-
ceuticals (.05/sh of Clinical Datalsh); Traffic.com ($8/sh); and ForuNet, Inc. ($2.25). See Boston Scien-
tific Completes Acquisition of CryoCor, REUTERS (May 28, 2008, 8:35 AM), http://www.reuters.
coni/article/2008/05/28/idUS132403+28-May-2008+PRN20080528; Clinical Data Completes Acquisition
of Avalon Pharmaceuticals, BUSINESS WIRE (May 28, 2009, 4:06 PM), http://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20090528006129/en/Clinical-Data-Completes-Acquisition-Avalon-Pharmaceuticals#.
VAjjSGSWx74; NAVTEQ Closes Acquisition of Traffic.com, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aX3FO4NeSiUU; Yuri Itkis Gaming Trust Of 1993
Begins Tender Offer To Acquire Remaining Public Stake In FortuNet, RTT NEWS (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:11
AM), http://www.rttnews.com/1181108/yuri-itkis-gaming-trust-of-1993-begins-tender-offer-to-acquire-
remaining-public-stake-in-fortunet-quick-facts.aspx.
78. See Romain Boissin, Orphan Versus Non-Orphan IPOs: The Difference Analyst Coverage
Makes, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON IPOS 257, 258 (Mario Levis & Silvio Vismara eds., 2013)
(finding after five years that the average negative return of an IPO issuer with analyst coverage was-
8.07%, compared with an average negative return of -52.95% for an IPO issuer without analyst cover-
age); see generally Simona Mola et al., Is There Life After the Complete Loss of Analyst Coverage?,
88 Accr. REV. 667 (2013) (finding that companies without analyst coverage for a year were much
more likely to delist than similar firms due to the name recognition benefit of analyst coverage).
79. The three forms are: Genitope (GTOP), Dover Saddlery (DOVR), and Salon.com, now
Salon Media (SLNM). Genitope Corporations Analyst Stocks Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://
www.nasdaq.com/symbol/gtop/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); Dover Saddlery, Inc. Ana-
lyst Stock Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/dovr/recommendations (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014); Salon Media Group, Inc. Analyst Stock Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://
www.nasdaq.com/symbollslnm/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
80. Morningstar (MORN) and Truett-Hurst (THST). Morninsgstar, Inc. Analyst Stock Recom-
mendations, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/morn/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20,
2014); Truett-Hurst, Inc. Analyst Stock Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symboll
thst/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
81. Overstock (OSTK). Overstock.com, Inc. Analyst Stock Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://
www.nasdaq.com/symbollostk/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
82. Google (GOOG) has nineteen firms covering its stock. Google.com Analyst Stocks Recom-
mendations, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/goog/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20,
2014). Rackspace Hosting (RAX) has sixteen firms covering its stock. Rackspace Hosting, Inc Analyst
Stocks Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/rax/recommendations (last visited
Oct. 20, 2014). NetSuite (N) has eight firms covering its stock. NetSuite Analyst Stocks Recommenda-
tions, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/n/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). A cur-
sory, nonscientific exploration of analyst coverage for other technology firms yields the following: Fa-
cebook (FB) has seventeen firms covering its stock; Zynga (ZNGA), ten; Groupon (GRPN), thirteen;
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IV. THE WILD WEST DAYS OF CROWDFUNDING
The vast majority of these crowdfunding projects seek altruistic or
artistic funding, but many sites, such as Kickstarter, feature entrepre-
neurs with projects that have commercial promise." To encourage back-
ers of projects that either are truly charitable or may not be profitable for
a long time or ever, artists or entrepreneurs may offer products or re-
wards," but anything more is legally problematic. Generally, five catego-
ries have emerged: (1) donor crowdfunding, (2) reward crowdfunding,
(3) prepurchase crowdfunding, (4) non-interest-bearing loan crowdfund-
ing, and (5) return crowdfunding.5 As the names suggest, donor crowd-
funding involves backers pledging money without receiving anything in
return. Donors in reward crowdfunding receive public radio-type "re-
wards" that increase in attractiveness at higher levels of giving.87 In pre-
purchase crowdfunding, entrepreneurs promise delivery of a finished
commercial product, financed through the project offering, either for free
or at a discount;" however, this promise of an early delivery seems to be
Linkedln (LNKD), 11. Facebook Analyst Stocks Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/
symbol/fb/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); Zynga Analyst Stocks Recommendations,
NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/zngalrecommendations (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); Groupon
Analyst Stocks Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/grpn/recommendations
(last visited Oct. 20, 2014); LinkedIn Analyst Stocks Recommendations, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.
com/symbol/Inkd/recommendations (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
83. For example, Kickstarter projects include consumer products, books, songs, graphic novels,
and films that are meant to someday be commercial successes. Kickstarter backers have backed movie
projects that did not initially attract investor funding, such as the Veronica Mars Movie and Zach
Braff's movie Wish I Was Here. See Maria Elena Fernandez, Zach Braff Sold His Movie, Kickstarter
Backers Await Rewards, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/pop-
culture/movies/zach-braff-sold-his-movie-kickstarter-backers-await-rewards-nl4031 (reporting that
after the Sundance Film Festival, Braff sold the distribution rights to his movie to Focus Features for
$2.75 million, but many crowdfunders had yet to receive their promised rewards). Actor James Franco
criticized Braff for using Kickstarter to fund a movie, the proceeds of which would go to Braff.
Margaret Eby, James Franco Slams Zach Braffs Kickstarter Campaign, N.Y. DAILY NEws (July 2,
2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.nydailynews.comlentertainment/tv-movies/james-franco-slams-zach-braff-
kickstarter-campaign-article-1.1388496.
84. Most sites encourage the offering of some type of "reward," "perk," or "the Goods." See
How It Works, STARTSOMEGOOD, https://startsomegood.com/HowltWorks#StepOneC (last visited
Oct. 20, 2014) ("Rewards offer a way to show gratitude to your supporters and allow them to form a
stronger connection with your cause. They're a tangible reminder to your supporters of the part they
played in getting your project off the ground. The more directly relevant they are to the impact you'll
make, the more connected supporters will feel towards your cause. The best rewards are unique, rele-
vant and desirable.").
85. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (2012) [hereinafter Bradford, Federal Securities].
86. Fundraising by individuals and non-profits receive no tangible rewards on sites such as
Crowdrise, but the platform may run promotions and contests for donors. See Promotions,
CROWDRISE.COM, http://www.crowdrise.com/give/promotions (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). (featuring
contests to win Beats headphones and iPad minis).
87. Great Perk Ideas, INDIEGOGO, http://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/201875343-
Great-Perk-Ideas (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) ("Perks enable you to engage fans, build trust and pro-
vide an opportunity for more people to get involved. You can offer one-of-a-kind experiences, special
acknowledgments or limited supply products.").
88. The most famous prepurchase crowdfunding story is the Pebble watch, a product of Pebble
Technology. Eric Migicovsky, the founder, had trouble getting funding, even though he participated in
Y Combinator, a popular Silicon Valley accelerator. His Kickstarter project set a target of $100,000 to
produce a smartwatch, and within a month he raised $10 million from 69,000 backers. See Jason Fell,
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unenforceable or at least conditional upon the project being operational-
ly successful." Finally, Kiva is the most well-known example of lenders
loaning small amounts of money with an expectation of having the prin-
cipal loan amount returned, but not with interest.'
These first four types of crowdfunding are examples of patron fund-
ing: project supporters, whether they consider themselves donors or fun-
ders or backers, are giving the project owners either the permanent or
temporary free use of their capital for very little in return. If the project
owner has created its rewards or prepurchases strategically, the funds re-
ceived will dwarf the cost of the token awards, however creative or inter-
esting." Patrons choose projects that they believe are important, inspir-
ing, or even urgent. Patron crowdfunding has flourished for many
reasons, not the least of which is that donations, gifts, and prepurchase
are unregulated beyond basic laws of fraud and deception. If patrons
want to give money, then laws are unnecessary to give them much more
protection than that they were not duped into giving.
Projects or enterprises" that promise funders a return on their in-
vestment face a much different legal landscape. Crowdfunding in which
the funder anticipates the possibility of a return, or investor crowdfund-
ing, creates many more problems for both the portal and the parties.
A. Investor Crowdfunding
Both equity crowdfunding and debt crowdfunding with an expecta-
tion of interest offer a return on a backer's investment above and beyond
a thank you card or DVD, but these types of platforms involve signifi-
cant legal issues. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act, as well as
state securities laws, regulate financial products that are deemed to be
"securities." Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act defines this term as in-
cluding various types of investments, including notes, stock, bonds, de-
bentures, puts, calls, straddles, options and a catch-all category of "in-
Pebble's $10 Million Crowdfunding Secret: Keep it Simple, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 24, 2013), http://
www.entrepreneur.comarticle/229427.
89. Most prepurchase Kickstarter projects do not deliver finished goods on time, and five per-
cent never do. See Ethan R. Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J.
Bus. VENTURING 1, 12 (2014) [hereinafter Mollick, Dynamics] (stating that seventy-five percent of
projects deliver products late, and that the more overfunded (overordered) a product is, the more like-
ly there will be manufacturing and shipping delays).
90. See Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L.J. 309,
349-50 (2013) (recommending less regulation of peer-to-peer lending in the United States and describ-
ing the Kiva model); Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for Microfinance
Lenders, 64 SMU L. REV. 1525 (2008) (discussing the proposal that Kiva lenders receive tax deduc-
tions in the form of a charitable donation equaling the foregone interest on their Kiva loan).
91. See Fernandez, supra note 84 (quoting a backer of Zach Braff's movie and frequent
Kickstarter backer as saying, "[i]f something resonates with me in a particular way, I'll back it").
92. Professor Sean O'Connor distinguishes between project crowdfunding, in which backers
provide funds for a particular project, and enterprise crowdfunding, in which backers provide funds to
an enterprise for general operating expenses. See Sean M. O'Connor, Crowdfunding's Impact on Start-
Up IP Strategy, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 895 (2014). Equity crowdfunding, in which backers re-
ceive shares in a legal entity, is necessarily enterprise crowdfunding. Id.
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vestment contract." 3 Types of financial products that are not specifically
listed or exempted will be considered "investment contracts" and thus
"securities" if they meet the test devised in SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.9 Un-
der this test, contracts such as certain partnership interests,5 limited lia-
bility company interests," and condominiums" may be securities if partic-
ipants invest "money in a common enterprise and [are] led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third party." 8 The sale
of equity participation by project owners to crowdfunders will fail the
Howey test.
Debt crowdfunding fares no better; courts have developed a sepa-
rate test, the Reves test," to determine whether a note, which is listed
within the Section 2(a)(1) definition of a security, might nevertheless re-
but that presumption and be exempt." Notes that bear a "family resem-
blance" to any of those listed by the Reves court will be considered not to
be securities.01 The listed notes are exempted based on the purpose of
the borrower in entering into the obligation, the plan of distribution, the
reasonable expectation of the investing public, and whether an alterna-
tive regulatory scheme exists to reduce the risk of the instrument:'m
The note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a
mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a
small business or some of its assets, the note evidencing a "charac-
ter" loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an as-
signment of accounts receivable, or a note that simply formalizes an
open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business (par-
93. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (2012).
94. 328 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1946).
95. Generally, general partnership interests are presumed not to be investment contracts, but
limited partnerships are, given that GP interests are usually active in nature, though LP interests are
passive. See SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that partner-
ship interests described as general partnership interests in limited liability partnerships were neverthe-
less securities because the "general partners" had little or no management control in fact and were too
inexperienced and unknowledgeable to exercise that control).
96. Limited liability company interests may constitute investment contracts under the Howey
test depending on the level of management control the membership interests retain. See Robinson v.
Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170-72 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that LLC interest was not an investment contract
when member had negotiated for management control and held officer positions).
97. Though real estate interests are not securities, condominium units may be considered securi-
ties if elements of the Howey test are met, such as the purchase including participation in a rental pool-
ing agreement. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1458 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding that is-
sues of fact existed as to whether rental pool was part of purchase agreement so as to create a common
enterprise). See also Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and
Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347, 1973
WL 158443 (Jan. 4,1973).
98. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. The Howey test has been applied to very creative structures de-
signed as attempts to circumvent securities laws. See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding that virtual shares that were part of an internet "fantasy" investment game were investment
contracts under the Howey test).
99. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,67 (1990).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 66-67.
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ticularly if, as in the case of a customer of a broker, it is collateral-
ized)."
The issuance of a note by a project owner to an investor crowdfunder,
with an obligation to pay interest on borrowed funds, will in all likeli-
hood fail the Reves test.'
1. Debt Crowdfunding
Debt crowdfunding is a way to combine the power of the Internet to
join individual lenders with the growing trend of microlending. For many
years, microfinance, particularly the making of microloans to small busi-
ness owners in developing nations, has been believed to be a powerful
force in alleviating poverty among "the poorest of the poor."10 Correct-
ing a market failure that results in the very poor not having access to
credit, microfinance promises to "disrupt" the status quo and transform
on a global scale." As an alternative to direct philanthropic and govern-
mental aid to developing countries, delivering business microcredit'" and
other banking services to the poor in those nations has been seen as a
way to empower and equip microentrepreneurs to increase their finan-
cial stability. Supporters as diverse as Bono"o and the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation" have testified as to the vast, unharnessed potential
of microfinance.
Kiva has been a very successful model for combining patron crowd-
funding and microfinance, enabling individual would-be lenders in de-
veloped economies to invest in individual entrepreneurs in developing
economies. Kiva's model of patron crowdfunding does not promise the
patron lender any interest on the microloan upon repayment-only the
103. Id. at 65 (citing Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984)).
104. Though the Reves court specifically held that notes should not be analyzed under the Howey
test because they are specifically listed in the definition of "security," a crowdlending site received a
Cease and Desist Order from the SEC on the grounds that promissory notes to crowdfunders were
securities under both the Howey and the Reves tests. See In re of Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Securities
Act Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913 (Nov. 24, 2008) (holding that notes issued by Prosper to
crowdlenders were securities).
105. Business participants in emerging markets use various terms to describe the poor. "Bottom
of the Pyramid," or BOP, is used to describe the four billion people on the earth that survive on $3000
or less a year. See ELISABETH RHYNE, MICROFINANCE FOR BANKERS AND INVESTORS:
UNDERSTANDING THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE MARKET AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
PYRAMiD 3 (2009). The "poorest segment of humanity" is often used to describe the one billion people
who exist on no more than $1 a day. Id. An additional billion people exist on more than $1 a day, but
less than $2.
106. See BEATRIZ ARMENDARIz & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE
2 (2d ed. 2010) ("For many observers, microfinance is nothing short of a revolution or a paradigm
shift.").
107. In this Article, the term "microcredit" is used interchangeably with "microloan" to describe a
small-scale loan.
108. 10 Questions for Bono, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/21/
readersopinions/bono-questions.html?pagewanted=all.
109. Press Release, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Grants Signal New Movement Toward
Savings Accounts for the Poor (January 13, 2010), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-
Center/Press-Releases/2010/01/Grants-Signal-New-Movement-Toward-Savings-Accounts-for-the-
Poor.
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repayment of principal. Kiva encourages patron lenders to reinvest that
principal in a subsequent loan to another entrepreneur, edging the model
closer to a donation model.no Early in Kiva's history, some commenters
wondered if Kiva was issuing securities, but the loans in Kiva's model
were arguably not securities for at least two reasons: first, investors were
not putting money at risk with an expectation of return under the Howey
test; and second, a peer-to-peer ("P2P") loan does not seem like a securi-
ty under the "family resemblance" test or the four principles behind the
"family resemblance" list."' The second argument came under fire when
users learned that specific loans were not being made to individual bor-
rowers but to investment funds in that borrower's community. 112 Howev-
er, the first argument prevailed.
The first argument, that Kiva lenders were not expecting a return,
evaporates when a P2P lending model promises the lender interest on
the loan. A loan from a Kiva fund to the microborrower probably is not a
security under the Reves test for the same reason that bank character
loans or mortgages are not. Particularly if that loan is made by a lending
institution under an alternative regulatory scheme, the microborrower is
hardly going to be deemed an issuer of securities. The note that crowd-
funders receive from the intermediary, however, probably is a security if
the crowdfunder expects a profit.
Though the term "microfinance" conjures up visions of rural mi-
croborrowers in subsistence economies, many have tried to transplant
the idea in developed economies such as the United States. Prosper and
Lending Club are two P2P lending sites that claim to connect return-
seeking investors with worthy loan applicants.11 3 Prosper crowdlenders
receive "Borrower Payment Dependent Notes" from Prosper, and bor-
rowing members receive loans from WebBank, each time a crowdlender
chooses to fund a particular borrower.1 14 Interest rates, depending on the
rating of the borrower, range from "AA" to "HR.""' Lending Club in-
110. See How Kiva Works, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/how (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
111. See Bradford, Federal Securities, supra note 86, at 35 (reasoning that because Kiva's investors
do not expect a return, then Kiva is not offering a security under either the Howey or the Reves test).
112. See Stephanie Strom, Confusion on Where Money Lent via Kiva Goes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2009, at B6 (reporting that money transferred to Kiva goes to funds that loan to individual borrowers,
not to the borrowers the patron lender chose).
113. Peer-to-Peer Lending for Your Investment Strategy, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/
invest/peer-to-peer-lending/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) ("Help hardworking families escape the credit
card trap, fund an entrepreneur's dream, or finance a dream wedding-while earning a healthy return.
Through Prosper.com, borrowers get fixed-rate personal loans that are smarter alternatives to high-
interest rate credit card debt that could take years to pay off. With easy monthly payments of principal
and interest to investors like you, borrowers get what they want without getting deeper into debt. Take
a look at our loan listings. These are real people with real stories, wants and needs."). A More Efficient
Model, LENDINGCLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/public/more-efficient-model.action (last visited
Oct. 20, 2014) ("By allowing our members to directly invest in and borrow from each other, we avoid
the cost and complexity of the banking system and pass the savings on to you. Both sides can win: bet-
ter rates to borrowers and better returns to investors. It's that simple.").
114. Legal Compliance, PROSPER (June 30,2011), http://prosper.com/legal/compliance/.
115. Why Invest with Prosper?, PROSPER, (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). According to the Prosper
website, rates range from 5.65% to 11.08%. Id.
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vestors commit to purchasing "Prime Consumer Notes" in the amount of
$25 or more, with the proceeds to be used to fund a member loan with a
rating of between "Al" and "G5," with riskier member loans promising
higher interest rates."' The loans to the borrowers are also originated by
WebBank, and the Prime Consumer Notes are issued by Lending Club."'
Both the Prosper notes and the Lending Club notes are not guaranteed
and are contingent on the borrower repaying the underlying loan, with
Prosper and Lending Club generally not bearing the risk of repayment."'
Both of these sites have had to become regulated by the SEC in order to
legally continue their lending programs," 9 and each registers the notes it
issues with the SEC.1 20 The regulatory scrutiny applied to these enterpris-
es has surely slowed the advance of microlending, particularly crowd-
funded microlending, in the United States."' The Peer-to-Peer Finance
Association of the United Kingdom, on the other hand, lists nine plat-
forms for U.K. borrowers and lenders. 22
2. Equity Crowdfunding
The offer and sale of stock or shares in a corporation clearly in-
volves the offer and sale of securities under the plain language of Section
2(a)(1). Likewise, the offer or sale of an investment interest in a limited
partnership, limited liability company, or even unincorporated project
may be a security under the Howey definition of "investment contract."
Like debt crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding, the sale of participatory
116. Earn Solid Returns, LENDING CLUB.COM, http://www.lendingclub.com/public/steady-
returns.action (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); How Does Peer Lending Work?, LENDING CLUB.COM,
http://www.lendingclub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). Accord-
ing to the Lending Club website, average borrower rates as of June 30, 2014 were 7.71% to 24.63%. Id.
117. See Legal Compliance, PROSPER, supra note 115; Risks of Investing, LENDING CLUB, http://
www.lendingclub.com/public/risk-of-investing.action (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
118. Id.
119. See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913 (Nov.
24, 2008) (holding that notes issued by Prosper to crowdlenders were securities).
120. See, e.g., Prosper Funding LLC & Prosper Marketplace Inc., Registration Statement (Form
S-1) (Dec. 21, 2012), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/00011
4036112052353/formsla.htm; Lending Club Corporation, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 27,
2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000119312514323136/d76681
ldsl.htm.
121. See generally Andrew Versteen, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 445 (2011) (describing the regulation of both Prosper and Lending Tree). Recently,
Ohio regulators issued a Cease and Desist Order against SoMoLend Holdings, LLC alleging, among
other things, selling unregistered notes without an exemption, not being registered as a broker-dealer,
and securities fraud. See In the Matter of SoMoLend Holdings, LLC, No. 13-022, 2013 WL 3243088
(Ohio Dep't Commerce June 14, 2013); Josh Pichler, State Reaches Settlement with SoMoLend, but
Future Uncertain, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 12,2014, available at 2014 WLNR 4010146 (explaining
that settlement allows SoMoLend to continue, but founder not subject of settlement).
122. See Members, PEER2PEER FINANCE ASSOCIATION, http://www.p2pfmanceassociation.org.uk/
(last visited Oct. 20,2014).
123. See SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 642-43, 645-45, 648 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that "joint
venture agreements" were investment contracts under Howey test).
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interests to the general public over the Internet, will violate the Securi-
ties Act by selling unregistered securities without an exemption.12 4
Though an IPO is the regulated venue for raising equity capital
through offerings to the public, SEC regulations provide various avenues
for privately placing securities with investors in nonpublic offerings.'2 1
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act prohibits only "public" offerings, creat-
ing a window for private offerings of securities, while Section 3(b) lists
three safe harbors found in Regulation D: Rule 504, Rule 505, and Rule
506.126 Rules 504 and 505 were promulgated under Section 3(b) and allow
private offerings of up to $1 million and $5 million, respectively; Rule
506, promulgated under Section 4(2), allows offerings of unlimited
amounts of securities to accredited investors and a small number of un-
accredited investors.'27
Very few crowdfunding projects to date have exceeded even the $1
million limit of Rule 504, suggesting that any of the Regulation D exemp-
tions may be available for crowdfunders. However, each rule has limita-
tions that preclude use by crowdfunded projects.'" In particular, until
very recently, one of the hallmarks and requirements of these safe har-
bors is that the offering may not be a "general solicitation" to the pub-
lic.1 29 Crowdfunding via an Internet website walks a strange path between
regulated public offerings and exempt private placements; crowdfunding
generally seeks to attract small amounts of capital, as in a private place-
ment, but in a very public offering from large numbers of investors. In
addition, Rules 505 and 506 limit the number of "unaccredited" investors
124. In November 2009, Michael Migliozzi II and Brian William Flatow solicited funds via website
("BuyaBeerCompany.com") to purchase Pabst Brewing Company. See In the Matter of Migliozzi II,
Securities Act Release No. 9216 (June 8, 2011) (accepting settlement of desisting from fundraising
efforts, which violated Section 5 of the Securities Act). Funders were promised "crowdsourced certifi-
cates of ownership" and beer should the offer be successful and monies collected. Id. The website, ad-
vertised via Facebook and Twitter, raised $200 million pledges from five million investors. Id. Howev-
er, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order to halt the project. Id. Pabst was eventually sold for $250
million to investor C. Dean Metropoulos's investment vehicle, Metropoulos & Co. See Tom Daykin,
New Pabst Owner Promises to Build Sales, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 28, 2010, http:/www.
jsonline.com/business/97357129.html.
Currently, Metropoulos is seeking a buyer for Pabst. See Denise Lockwood, Pabst Brewing Company
Owner Wants to Sell, MILWAUKEE Bus. J. (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/
news/2014/03/03/pabst-brewing-company-owner-wants-to.html (reporting that Markopoulos was con-
sidering either a private sale or an IPO).
125. Regulation A also provides for "mini-registration" for small offerings, but it is rarely used
compared with the other exemptions, particularly Rule 506. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Regula-
tion A: Small Business' Search for 'A Moderate Capital,' 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77,83 (2006) (finding that
Regulation A registration was used an average of eight times a year).
126. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012); id. § 77c(b) (2012).
127. Id. § 77c(b); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505; 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
128. For example, shares issued under Rule 504 are restricted and cannot be resold without regis-
tration 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014). Rule 505 and 506 require suitable disclosures to be given to unac-
credited investors, which are limited in number to thirty-five. Id. at 17 C.F.R. § 230.505; § 230.506
(2014).
129. See infra Section V.D.2 (discussing the JOBS Act's elimination of the prohibition against
general solicitation for Rule 506 offerings).
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that may participate in the offering.'" Because general solicitation of in-
vestments necessarily involves hundreds if not thousands of investors,
many of whom would not qualify as accredited investors, a crowdfunding
offering by its very nature does not qualify as an exempt private place-
ment under any exemption."'
Interestingly, one of the more difficult exemptions for startup com-
panies to satisfy in a traditional private placement may prove to be the
only exemption suitable for pre-JOBS Act crowdfunding. Section
3(a)(11)'32 exempts intrastate offerings of any size, as long as all offerees
and purchasers are residents of the same state, and the issuer is both in-
corporated and headquartered in that state. Several states have passed or
are considering intrastate crowdfunding regulations ahead of final regu-
lations for federal crowdfunding, making crowdfunding efforts that meet
the requirements of intrastate offerings exempt from both state and fed-
eral regulation.1 33 As studies have shown that much of crowdfunding is
used for local projects, smaller businesses may do well to launch strictly
local offerings to those in their community, who may get a larger sense of
civic pride in participating. Section 3(a)(11), however, restricts "offerees"
to residents, so portals have to exact detailed information from browsing
would-be crowdfunders before letting them view detailed projects.134
130. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2014) (defining "accredited investor" as a person: "(1)
whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, exceeds $1 million, excluding
the value of the person's primary residence" (the "net worth test"); or "(2) who had an individual in-
come in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years, or joint income with that person's
spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years, and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the
same income level in the current year" (the "income test")." Many critics urged Congress or the SEC
to increase these tests as part of the Dodd-Frank Act due to the tests not having been amended in
decades and not being indexed for inflation. The only change that was made, however, was to exclude
the value of a person's primary residence from the calculation of net worth. See The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2012).
131. See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REv. 879 (2011) [hereinafter Heminway &
Hoffman, Peril] (analyzing relevant federal securities law and determining that equity crowdfunding
participations were investment contracts and therefore securities).
132. Id. § 77c ("Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident
within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing busi-
ness within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory.").
133. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11 (2014), available at http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/
ACASLoginfire.asp; Invest Georgia Exemption, GA. CODE ANN. § 590-4-2.-08 (2014); S. 375, 118th
Indiana Gen. Assembly (2014) (effective July 1, 2014), available at http://iga.in.gov/legislative/
2014/bills/senate/375/#; Invest Kansas Exemption, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-1-1 (2014), available at http://
www.sos.ks.gov/pubs/kar/2009/4%20081_81-Office%20of%20the%20Securities%20Commissioner%2
02009%20KAR%2OVol%204.pdf; Michigan Invests Locally Exemption Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
451.2202a (2014), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(tqbdxl552qcvmd55kbpzbl55))/
documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-451-2202a.pdf; Washington JOBS Act of 2014, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.270
(2014), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2013-14PdflBils/Session%2Laws/
House/2023-S.SL.pdf; Wis. STAT. § 551.202(13)(ar) (West 2014), available at https://docs.legis.
wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/551.pdf#page=6. Legislation in other states, such as North Carolina, has
been proposed. See, e.g., North Carolina Jumpstart Our Businesses Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-17.1
(2014), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/House/PDF/H68Ov4.pdf.
134. See LOCALSTAKE LLC, http://localstake.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). When I visited this
site, I was asked to first sign up to enter the site, then I was asked to set up a funding account, which
required my address, social security number, and driver license number, among other things. See also
GROUNDFLOOR, http://groundfloor.us (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). When I registered for this site, it
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Professor Joan Heminway has aptly analogized equity crowdfund-
ing to file sharing in the music industry."' Like file sharing, equity crowd-
funding is almost impossible to do legally, but too easy not to do.',
As crowdfunding publicity grew, however, so did the watchful eyes
of regulators, and websites dedicated to matching for-profit entrepre-
neurs with equity investors went dark.' One particularly promising site,
ProFounder, argued that its site fell under the nonpublic offering exemp-
tion of Section 4(2) because only those investors invited by project
founders could access the site."' Unfortunately, California regulators
avoided this argument by issuing a Cease and Desist Order based on the
fact that the portal was not registered as a broker-dealer with the State of
California.13 9
Debt crowdfunding sites were able to withstand regulation by hav-
ing the site itself register with the SEC and issue notes to crowdlenders,
with repayment conditional on the borrowers repaying particular loans.
The preapproved borrowers have a contractual obligation to pay a fixed
rate of interest, limiting the amount of risk the site bears. To create legal
equity crowdfunding, only three avenues were available prior to the
JOBS Act. First, each crowdfunding project could register the offered
shares, incurring a cost that could far exceed the benefits of the offering.
Second, equity crowdfunding sites could register shares with the SEC
sent me an email with the following language: "As soon as we're set up in your state, you'll be among
the very first to know." Id. However, I was allowed to view projects and "follow" those I was interest-
ed in. Id. Text on the page listing potential projects warned me: "Information on this page is not an
offer or a solicitation to sell or purchase securities. Clicking 'Follow' expresses a desire to learn more
about a particular real estate project, developed by a third party independent to us. Statements on this
page are for informational purposes only." Id.
135. See Joan Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals under the
CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L. J. 177, 189 (2013) [hereinafter Heminway, Funding Por-
tals.].
136. Though Kickstarter's rules require projects to offer "rewards," it specifically prohibits offer-
ing securities. However, this rule was apparently not monitored. See Christine Hurt, Peer-to-Peer Mi-
crofinancing for the Arts? Looking at Kickstarter, CONGLOMERATE (July 9, 2010), http://www.the
conglomerate.org/2010/07/peertopeer-microfinancing-for-the-arts-looking-at-kickstarter.html (review-
ing projects on the site and finding one offering LLC shares). Many sites have at times given a plat-
form to equity crowdfunders. See Heminway & Hoffman, Peril, supra note 132, at 963-65 tbl.1 (listing
five U.S. sites, including Kickstarter and IndieGoGo, that hosted projects offering equity participation
or revenue sharing in 2011).
137. See Bradford, Federal Securities, supra note 86, at 24-25 (describing the bright future and
untimely demise of ProFounder, which heralded the end to equity crowdfunding sites in the United
States). ProFounder was founded by Jessica Jackley, cofounder of Kiva under the premise of crowd-
funding micro-equity to entrepreneurs in the U.S. Leena Rao, Fundraising Platform for Startups Pro-
founder Shuts its Doors, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 17, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/17/startup-
fundraising-platform-profounder-shuts-its-doors/.
138. See Heminway & Hoffman, Peril, supra note 132, at 919 n.205 (explaining that ProFounder
acted not as a capital-raising mechanism but more as a communication tool for startups seeking fund-
ing from friends and family).
139. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORP., CONSENT ORDER TO DESIST AND REFRAIN 3 (Aug. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.dbo.ca.gov/ENF/pdfl2011/ProFounder -CO.pdf. Similar sites that limit capital
raising from accredited investors have tried to avoid this fate by registering with the SEC, FINRA, and
all applicable state regulators at substantial cost. See Angus Loten, Crowd-Funding Brings Unease,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17,2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203611404577042333
598282986 (describing the experiences of Bill Clark at MicroVenture Marketplace, Inc. and Onnie
Carr at WealthForge LLC).
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and offer those shares to crowdfunders. Then, the site could be the sole
accredited investor in each funded project, falling squarely within any
private placement safe harbor. Each site, though, would also need to reg-
ister with the SEC as an investment company regulated under the In-
vestment Company Act, adding an additional layer of expense. Unlike
debt crowdfunding sites, the equity crowdfunding sites would take on a
significant amount of investment risk as well. Third, a crowdfunding site
could purport to merely match accredited investors with worthy projects,
walking the line between "online" and "nonpublic.""a Equity crowdfund-
ing websites in other countries, however, have flourished. 41
With the passage of the JOBS Act in April 2012, the illegality of ex-
isting and past efforts to create equity crowdfunding portals in the
United States became clear.1 4 2 Title III of the JOBS Act, however, creat-
ed an exemption for equity (and debt) crowdfunding, though the provi-
sions of new Section 4(6) of the Securities Act could more accurately be
described as regulation than exemption.
V. LEGAL EQUITY CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE JOBS AcT
As the crowd awaited the new exemption, commentators disagreed
on whether an exemption was long overdue or ill-conceived populism.
Prior to the passage of the CROWDFUND Act, scholars worried that
exempting capital raising by and among strangers over the Internet
would open the floodgates to fraud.'43 If the securities laws were meant to
protect investors, then surely they were meant to protect the amateur in-
140. See MICROVENTURES, INC., www.microventures.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); CIRCLEUP,
www.circleup.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). These accredited investor-only sites are registered as
broker-dealers with FINRA. Id. Another variation is an accredited investor-only debt crowdfunding
model. See FUNDING CIRCLE, www.fundingcircle.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
141. According to the Crowdfunding Industry Report, in 2011, startups raised $88 million world-
wide through equity funding platforms. Gerrit K.C. Ahlers et al., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding 10
(Social Science Research Network, Working Paper No. 2161587, 2012), available at http://ssm.
com/abstract=2161587. Sixty-seven percent of that capital was raised on two platforms: Ireland's
SeedUps and the Australian Small Scale Offerings Board (ASSOB). Id. As of April 2012, when Presi-
dent Barack Obama signed the JOBS Act, thirty-nine platforms operated to attract equity crowdfund-
ing, and 452 platforms to attract any kind of crowdfunding. Id. at 9. See also Crowdfunding: Connect-
ing Investors and Job Creators Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin Servs. & Bailout of Pub.
and Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. 4 (Sept. 15, 2011)
(statement of Jeff Lynn, CEO, Seedrs Limited) [hereinafter Lynn Testimony] (describing the decision
to launch Seedrs in the U.K. rather than in the U.S. because of the availability of a workable securities
exemption for crowdfunding).
142. See Anita Hamilton, Crowdfunding Soared to $2.7 Billion in 2012, but Equity Crowdfunding
Is Still on Ice, TIME (Apr. 8, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/04/08/crowdfunding-soared-to-2-7-
billion-in-2012-but-equity-funding-is-still-on-ice/ (estimating that only four percent of crowdfunding in
2012 was equity crowdfunding because of illegality concerns).
143. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 13 (Dec. 1, 2011) (statement
of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolph A. Berle Prof. of Law, Columbia University Law School) [hereinafter
Coffee Testimony] (testifying that without proper regulation, crowdfunding sites would become the
new "boiler rooms"); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks
and the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2012).
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vestor clicking on projects created by unknown strangers.'" Retail inves-
tors, particularly unaccredited investors, are generally not invited to par-
ticipate in private placements,'45 and, in fact, Rules 505 and 506 create
huge incentives for issuers to sell only to accredited investors.'6 Any type
of investor may purchase registered securities, even IPO securities, but
investors are thought to be protected by required disclosures of infor-
mation and gatekeepers such as underwriters, law firms, and public ac-
counting firms.147 Securities regulation balances a tension between easy
capital formation and investor protection, but a liberal crowdfunding ex-
emption might tilt the investing landscape too much in the direction of
entrepreneurs, honest, dishonest, or even fake, looking to raise capital. 4 1
The resulting CROWDFUND Act, however, seemed to be a compro-
mise that made no one happy.
A. The CROWDFUND Act
The CROWDFUND Act amends the Securities Act to add Section
4(6) and Section 4A. Section 4(6) provides that transactions involving the
offer or sale of securities by an issuer will be exempt if they are sold
through a broker'49 or funding portal described in Section 4A(a); if the
issuer complies with the requirements of Section 4A(b); and if the aggre-
gate offering amounts and individual investment amounts are limited.
Specifically:
* The aggregate amount sold to all investors by the issuer, in-
cluding any amount sold in reliance on the exemption pro-
vided under this paragraph during the twelve-month period
144. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 54 (Dec. 1, 2011) (statement of
Meredith Cross, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC) ("Due to the nature of crowdfunding ventures,
crowdfunding investors may have limited investment experience, limited information upon which to
make investment decisions, and almost no ability to negotiate for protections."); C. Steven Bradford,
The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 196 (2012)
(describing crowdfunding as a "potentially dangerous combination of investment risk and relatively
unsophisticated investors").
145. See William K. Sjostrom, Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1143, 1147 (2013) (describing the practical logistics of the private placement process).
146. Both Rule 505 and 506 limit the number of unaccredited investors who may participate in
any offering to thirty-five, and issuers must provide those investors, but not unaccredited investors,
with adequate disclosure documents. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 203.506(b)(2)(i) (2014).
147. See generally Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief Why Attorneys Who
Invest in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are "Selling Out," Not "Buying In," 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897
(2003) (discussing the roles of investment banks, accounting firms and law firms as gatekeepers to the
capital markets in IPOs).
148. See Thomas A. Martin, The JOBS Act of 2012: Balancing Fundamental Securities Law Prin-
ciples with the Demands of the Crowd (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper No. 2040953,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040953.
149. Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Disclosure (CROWDFUND)
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, §§ 301-305 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). Most of the commentary and debate focuses on portal-enabled crowd-
funding. For a discussion of whether the broker model will ever materialize, see Robert B. Thompson
& Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising,
98 CORNELL L. REv. 1573, 1607 (2013).
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preceding the date of such transaction, is not more than
$1,000,000;'0o
The aggregate amount sold to any investor"' by an issuer,
including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption
provided under this paragraph during the twelve-month pe-
riod preceding the date of such transaction, does not ex-
ceed-
o The greater of $2000 or five percent of the annual
income or net worth of such investor, as applicable,
if either the annual income or the net worth of the
investor is less than $100,000; and
o Ten percent of the annual income or net worth1 2 of
such investor, as applicable, not to exceed a maxi-
mum aggregate amount sold of $100,000, if either
the annual income or net worth of the investor is
equal to or more than $100,000."'
As stated in Section 4(6), the offering must take place through an inter-
mediary that complies with Section 4A(a), which requires registration
with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). In addi-
tion, the intermediary must ensure that each investor has passed a non-
specific financial literacy test, must "take measures to reduce the risk of
fraud" and "ensure that all offering proceeds are only provided to the is-
suer when the aggregate capital raised from all investors is equal to or
greater than a target offering amount," in addition to other require-
ments.m" Section 4A(c) also provides for liability for material misstate-
ments and omissions for intermediaries as a "person who offers or sells
the security."1 5 5
150. Earlier versions of this legislation had higher maximum amounts. Compare Entrepreneurial
Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2 (a) (2011) (as introduced, setting a $5 million maxi-
mum amount) with Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H. R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011) (setting
a $1 million maximum amount and a $2 million maximum amount if the issuer provides audited finan-
cials as passed in the House Nov. 3, 2011).
151. This limitation applies whether the investor is a retail investor, accredited investor, or institu-
tional investor. See Proposed Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 14, at 66,434. Issuers are free to
launch a separate offering for accredited investors under a Regulation D private placement exemption
at the same time, however. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014).
152. Many comments were submitted to the SEC about this statutory ambiguity. See Proposed
Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 14, at 66,433-34. Though the preceding provision had a "greater
of" provision that applied to annual income or net worth, that language does not appear in subsection
(b). In the regulations, the SEC proposes using a "greater of" calculation. Id.
153. Id. at 66, 430.
154. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)-(12)(2012) (requiring intermediaries to
make efforts to ensure investors do not exceed aggregate crowdfunding limits, to protect privacy of
investors, not to compensate promoters or finders, and to prohibit portal or broker insiders from hav-
ing financial interest in any issuer-client).
155. See id. § 77d-1(c); see also Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, (Social
Science Research Network, Working Paper No. 2325634, 2013), available at http://www.ssrn.
com/abstract=2325634. The proposed SEC regulations make clear this liability could be under Section
12(a)(2) and Section 17 of the Securities Act for exempted transactions. In the summary, the SEC ap-
pears to be giving intermediaries a due diligence defense, but that assumes that the intermediaries will
undertake underwriter-like due diligence:
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Though the requirement of having a registered portal that may be
subject to liability seems burdensome, the disclosure requirements on
crowdfunding issuers may be even more onerous."' Section 4A(b) sets
out details for the substances of disclosures that the issuers must make to
prospective investors. 15 In addition to a description of financial condition
and the securities for sale, for target offering amounts of up to $100,000,
the issuer must provide one year of income tax returns and certified fi-
nancial statements. 15  For target offering amounts of up to $500,000, the
issuer must provide financial statements reviewed by an independent
public accountant.5 9 Finally, for target offering amounts of more than
$500,000, the issuer must provide audited financial statements.'10 The
statute also provides for annual disclosures "as the Commission shall, by
rule, determine appropriate."' 6' Additionally, crowdfunding issuers must
"not advertise the terms of the offering, except for notices which direct
investors to the funding portal or broker." 6 2 Finally, though not part of
the CROWDFUND Act, the JOBS Act amended Section 12(g)(1) of the
Securities Act to allow issuers to remain "nonreporting" as long as their
shares are held by less than 2000 shareholders, up from 500.163 More im-
portantly, crowdfunding investors are not included in that number.*6
On the basis of this definition, it appears likely that intermediaries, including funding portals,
would be considered issuers for purposes of this liability provision. We believe that steps inter-
mediaries could take in exercising reasonable care in light of this liability provision would include
establishing policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the
requirements of Regulation Crowdfunding, and that include the intermediary conducting a re-
view of the issuer's offering documents before posting them to the platform to evaluate whether
they contain materially false or misleading information.
See Proposed Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 14, at 66,499.
156. Some commentators urged Congress to provide investor protection through issuer disclo-
sure; others suggested that intermediaries might be able to bear the burden of increased regulation.
Unfortunately, Congress seemed to agree with both ideas. See Hazen, supra note 143, at 1750-55 (de-
tailing earlier versions of the crowdfunding provisions and analyzing how arguments for meaningful
disclosure were paramount in the resulting form); see also Hearing on the JOBS Act-Importance of
Effective Implementation, Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private
Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of C.
Steven Bradford, Earl Dunlap Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law) ("To the extent that additional regulation is required, it should be centered on crowdfunding
intermediaries-brokers and funding portals-rather than on the entrepreneurs raising funds.").
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b) (2012).
158. See id. § 77d-1(b)(D)(i).
159. See id. § 77d-1(b)(D)(ii).
160. See id. § 77d-1(b)(D)(iii).
161. See id. § 77d-1(b)(4).
162. See id. § 77a. Presently, many project founders with Kickstarter campaigns advertise on local
radio, newspapers, social media and more. These advertisements now will have to meet the require-
ments of Section 4A. Id.
163. See Securities Exchange of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012); Sjostrom, supra note 145, at 1153.
Only five hundred of those shareholders may be unaccredited, though employees who hold stock re-
ceived as compensation are not counted. See also Usha Rodrigues, Lies, Damned Lies and Securities
Regulation, 2015 U. ILL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (providing data that does not seem to support the
argument that companies were being pushed to IPO because they were bumping against the five hun-
dred shareholder limit).
164. See Rodrigues, supra note 164.
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Many commentators who were hoping for an exemption that would
provide a cheap and easy path to crowdfundingl 65 bemoaned the cost of
disclosure, particularly ongoing disclosure, as well as other costly re-
quirements. Mapping on audited financial statement requirements to the
quirky and creative projects touted on websites by brand-new entrepre-
neurs without a corporate form did not seem to be a good fit. Section
4(6) was a bucket of cold water on fantasies of a brave new world of
crowdfunding. As one industry participant has noted, the
CROWDFUND Act creates a world for "Merrill Minus" offerings, not
"Kickstarter Plus" offerings.1" Though the requirements were clearly less
onerous and cheaper than a full-blown IPO, they were much more com-
plex and costly than imagined. The statute did leave some of the details
to the SEC to flesh out in regulations; however, the SEC could only
tighten the detailed statute with more requirements, not fewer.
B. Regulation Crowdfunding
The SEC voted to release proposed"7 regulations interpreting Sec-
tions 4(6) and 4A on October 23, 2013, almost two years overdue. Be-
cause Congress made the CROWDFUND Act so detailed, the SEC had
very little leeway to subtract, and not much to add, to flesh out the new
provisions in the Securities Act.' 8 As expected, the regulations did little
to alleviate the restrictions of the CROWDFUND Act,'1 69 though the
165. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1604 (stating that proponents of crowdfund-
ing "had wanted a nearly regulation-free zone wherein startups and other early stage issuers
could at little cost use the Internet, either directly or through funding portals, to display their
business plan and seek out small investors who share their entrepreneurial dream, however
risky it might be").
166. See Thaya Brook Knight et al., A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer on Securities Crowdfund-
ing and Title III of the JOBS Act, 2 MICH. J. PVT. EQ. & VENTUJRE CAP. L. 135, 137 (2013) ("To date,
one of the hallmarks of crowdfunding has been its passion ... [u]nfortunately, selling securities re-
quires more than enthusiasm.").
167. Comments were open on the proposed rules for ninety days ending February 3, 2014.
Deborah L. Jacobs, SEC Proposes Crowdfunding Rules, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013, 2:41PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/10/23/sec-proposes-crowdfunding-rules/.
168. Compare the detailed provisions of the JOBS Act to the Dodd-Frank Act, wherein Congress
required the SEC to promulgate rules on ninety topics, some with little guidance. For example, Section
971 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act to allow the SEC to issue
rules requiring shareholder proxy access:
The rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission under paragraph (1) may include-
(A) a requirement that a solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization by (or on behalf of) an is-
suer include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to serve on the board of directors of the issu-
er; and
(B) a requirement that an issuer follow a certain procedure in relation to a solicitation described
in subparagraph (A).
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012). The proxy rules that the SEC eventually promul-
gated were struck down, however, by a federal district court as violating the Administrative Proce-
dures Act. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Jill E. Fisch, The
Destructive Ambiguity of Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435 (2011). Perhaps after that political debacle,
Congress felt that more detail and less discretion was a better tactic.
169. But see Crowdfunding Proposal, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations, Oversight,
and Regulations of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. (Jan. 16, 2014) (statement of Mercer
Bullard, Pres., Fund Democracy) [hereinafter Bullard Testimony] (criticizing the SEC for its interpre-
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SEC was pressured to do so by many commentators. 170 The end result is
that the regulations do very little to alter the arguably unworkable re-
gime outlined by Congress.1 71
The criticized restrictions were left in place, including the aggregate
cap of $1 million, the disclosure requirements,'1 7 2 and the portal registra-
tion requirements. The SEC did ask for comments on whether the
$500,000 trigger for audited financial statements should be increased 73
and whether the $1 million cap should be net of fees. 74
The regulations did, however, attempt to alleviate some of the re-
strictiveness of Section 4(6) by proposing that offerings under 4(6) would
not be aggregated or integrated with other exempt offerings,"' meaning
that an issuer could offer crowdfunded securities within twelve months of
offering securities in a separate private placement.' For example, an is-
suer could raise up to $5 million in a Rule 505 offering and up to $1 mil-
lion in a 4(6) offering by crowdfunding within the same year or even
simultaneously. Of course, if the rationale behind crowdfunding is that
small businesses avoid even Regulation D private placements because of
tations of the statutory language regarding integration and the currentness of financial disclosures re-
quired).
170. See, e.g., Oversight of the JOBS Act: Importance of Effective Implementation Before the Sub-
comm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs of the H. Oversight & Gov't
Reform Comm., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Alon Hillel-Tuch, CFO, RocketHub) [hereinafter
RocketHub Testimony] (urging the SEC to raise the $500,000 threshold for providing audited financial
statements and to raise the $1 million crowdfunding cap to $5 million).
171. See Steven M. Davidoff, Trepidation and Restrictions Leave Crowdfunding Rules Weak, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:10PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/trepidation-and-
restrictions-leave-crowdfunding-rules-weak/ [hereinafter Davidoff, Trepidation] (reporting that the
SEC "largely parroted" what Congress had set out in the CROWDFUND Act).
172. The proposed regulations do, however, allow issuers to use "financial statements for the fis-
cal year prior to the issuer's most recently completed fiscal year." See Proposed Regulation Crowd-
funding, supra note 14, at 66,554 (Instruction 8). This has led Prof. Bullard to warn of harmful effects
from the use of "stale" disclosures. See Bullard Testimony, supra note 170. Most commentators, how-
ever, worry that crowdfunding startups will not have "stale" or "fresh" financial statements, but will
have to incur substantial cost to prepare them. See SEC's Crowdfunding Proposal: Will It Work for
Small Businesses?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations, Oversight, and Regulations of the
H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. (Jan. 16, 2014) (statement of Daniel S. Gorfine, Director,
Milken Institute) (suggesting that targeting fraudsters was a better avenue for combatting fraud than
requiring startups to prepare traditional disclosures).
173. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012) (requiring audited financial statements for
target offering amounts of more than $500,000 "or such other amount as the Commission may estab-
lish, by rule"). But see Bullard Testimony, supra note 170 (criticizing the SEC for interpreting subsec-
tion (iii) to allow the SEC only to increase, but not decrease that trigger).
174. See Proposed Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 14, at 66,432. ("Should we propose that
the $1 million limit be net of fees charged by the intermediary to host the offering on the intermedi-
ary's platform? Why or why not? If so, are there other fees that we should allow issuers to exclude
when determining the amount to be raised and whether the issuer has reached the $1 million limit?").
175. See id. at 66,430-32.
176. Rule 502 requires "integration" of all sales that "are part of the same Regulation D offering"
that are made less than six months before the start of a Regulation D offering or are made less than six
months after completion of that offering. 17 C.F.R. 230.502(a) (2014). Therefore, for example, an issu-
er could not purport to host a separate Rule 505 offering in February and then a Rule 504 offering in
July unless the two offerings combined comported with the rules of each and did not exceed the $1
million offering cap in Rule 504. Id. If Section 4(6) offerings were integrated with Regulation D offer-
ings in the same twelve month period, then any crowdfunded offering would be aggregated with those
offerings and would have to meet the requirements of each of them. Id.
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the cost and complexity, one wonders why a crowdfunding issuer would
do both instead of just the Regulation D placement. That being said, one
of the unintended consequences of that proposal, however, may be to al-
low general solicitation for a crowdfunding campaign offered simultane-
ously with a Rule 506 offering, described below. 7
C. The JOBS Act Enhances Other Capital-Raising Avenues
The CROWDFUND Act was not a stand-alone piece of final legis-
lation. Earlier bills proposed to legalize crowdfunding were the building
blocks of the crowdfunding provisions in the larger JOBS Act, 7  which
was a push by various constituencies to encourage more IPOs, particular-
ly IPOs among smaller issuers. The much-lauded rationale of the JOBS
Act, particularly the provisions liberalizing rules to encourage smaller
businesses to conduct IPOs, was to increase job creation. 9
1. The IPO On-Ramp
To that end, the JOBS Act attempts to make the IPO process easier
for smaller companies and to expand the usefulness of certain kinds of
private placements. One of the major amendments to the IPO process
was the creation of the much-discussed "on-ramp" for "emerging growth
companies"("EGC"),'8 which allows companies with less than $1 billion
in revenues to avoid some of the more onerous requirements of the IPO
process' and its ongoing disclosure function for up to five years." To
date, numerous companies have taken advantage of the ability to file reg-
istration documents confidentially"' and avoid certain disclosures; in fact,
177. See Bullard Testimony, supra note 170, at 5 (warning that allowing a Section 4(6) crowd-
funded offering within the same twelve months as a Rule 506 offering could change the nature of the
crowdfunding statute by allowing general solicitation and attracting larger issuers that could dominate
the market).
178. See Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13
U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 207, 234 (2013) (describing the JOBS Act as an "odd amalgam of different secu-
rities regulation provisions, brought together with little effort made at integration"); Hazen, supra
note 144, at 1750-53 (detailing the earlier crowdfunding proposals as they led to the CROWDFUND
Act).
179. See Guttentag, supra note 179, at 243 (quoting the purpose of the JOBS Act to "increase
American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for
emerging growth companies").
180. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 b(a)(19)
(2012)) (defining "emerging growth company").
181. Id. § 105(d) (allowing EGCs the unparalleled ability to solicit indications of interest from
qualified institutional banks and accredited investors prior to filing a registration statement); id. §
77f(e) (allowing EGCs to file a registration statement on a confidential basis).
182. Several high profile companies have chosen to elect one or more of the opt-outs available to
EGCs, including Twitter and GoPro. Twitter was able to file its Form S-1 registration statement confi-
dentially and omit certain information from that registration statement. See Tomio Geron, Twitter
Files for IPO-Confidentially, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2013, 5:11PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomio
geron/2013/09/12/twitter-files-for-ipo-confidentially/.
183. § 77f(e). This section allows companies to file Form S-1 confidentially, with the document
not being available on EDGAR. Id. Once the registration statement is declared effective, however, the
documents are then publicly available. Id. This aspect of the IPO on-ramp allows companies to with-
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more companies have begun IPOs as EGCs than have not.'" The JOBS
Act also increased the $5 million offering limitation to $50 million to
make the rarely-used "mini-registration" process known as Regulation A
more attractive. 85
Neither of those changes competes directly with crowdfunding's
Section 4(6) or is inherently inconsistent. Though the IPO on-ramp defi-
nitely liberalizes the process, it merely offers a disclosure discount cou-
pon to issuers who were probably going to launch an expensive IPO re-
gardless. Regulation A also entails more registration cost and complexity
than Section 4(6).
2. Rule 506 and General Solicitation
Raising capital through a Regulation D exemption would be the
traditional, legal alternative to illegal investor crowdfunding. The largest
benefit legal crowdfunding would have over a Regulation D private
placement would be that, under Rule 502, no offering under any of the
Regulation D exemptions, Rules 504, 505, or 506, may be conducted with
"general solicitation" of offerees.16 6 Therefore, underwriters or brokers
must offer these securities only to offerees who have a preexisting rela-
tionship with the offeror or the issuer. Specifically, a private placement
could never involve soliciting investments from strangers over the Inter-
net . 8 Title IP" of the JOBS Act, however, eliminated this restrictive lim-
itation for Rule 506 private placements.
Effective September 23, 2013, offerings under Rule 506 may be
conducted using general solicitation of any kind, as long as the issuer
takes "reasonable steps" to ensure that all purchasers are accredited in-
vestors. 8 9 Not to overstate the importance of lifting this ban, but general
solicitation for private placements could be a sea change for capital rais-
ing outside of the IPO."t ' Though the IPO is a "public offering," solicita-
tion of prospective buyers prior to a registration statement being de-
clared effective could not be called "general" or "public." All solicitation
of prospective buyers must conform to the very detailed and limited rules
draw from registration without the public dissecting its registration materials should problems arise
involving either the registration process or selling efforts. Id.
184. See David Gelles & Michael J. de la Merced, "The New Normal" for Tech Companies and
Others: The Stealth P.O., N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9,2014, at B1 (citing research by Renaissance Capital that
seventy to eighty percent of companies that launched IPOs in 2013 did so as EGCs).
185. See § 77c(b)(2)(A); Coffee Testimony, supra note 144 (testifying that in 2010, seven compa-
nies issued shares under Regulation A).
186. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014).
187. See id. § 230.502(c)(1) (prohibiting "[a]ny advertisement, article, notice or other communica-
tion published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio").
188. See JOBS Act, 15 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012).
189. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464,54, 47-72 (proposed Sept. 5,2012) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)).
190. See Usha Rodrigues, SEC Releases Final Rule Allowing General Advertising for Certain Pri-
vate Offerings, CONGLOMERATE (Jul. 11, 2013), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/07/sec-releases-
final-rule-allowing-general-advertising-for-certain-private-offerings.html.
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of public offering registration: all "offers" must be accompanied by a
written "prospectus""' that conforms to Section 10 of the '33 Act, and
any "written communication" constitutes a "prospectus." 19 Furthermore,
any "graphic communication," including an Internet website, constitutes
a "written" communication. 93 Prior to filing a registration statement, the
issuer and others must not advertise the upcoming offering or otherwise
"condition the market."1 94 Even during a public offering, issuers have to
be careful about any written information, including information on their
websites that mentions the offering."'9 Even with the IPO reforms of
2005, nonreporting issuers are severely limited in how they interact with
the public during registration. Accordingly, much of the selling effort
takes place orally, either by telephone or face-to-face during road shows.
Now, in a Rule 506 offering, an issuer could theoretically raise just as
much money as in an IPO, albeit from accredited investors, and advertise
on billboards, Super Bowl commercials, the Internet, Twitter, Facebook,
or an airplane banner."*
Though the new Rule 506 may result in a decrease in IPOs,'" it
surely will result in a decrease in interest in crowdfunding.1 98 While a
publicly solicited Rule 506 offering may only involve accredited inves-
tors, the costs of such an offering may be substantially less for the issuer
than a Section 4(6) crowdfunding campaign. The infrastructure waiting
for crowdfunding, such as online platforms, can easily be used for accred-
ited investor-only crowdfunding, without worries of violating the general
solicitation ban. Or, a larger issuer could simultaneously launch a Rule
506 offering using general solicitation and a crowdfunding campaign,
which will benefit from the free advertising. Unfortunately, this accredit-
ed investor-only crowdfunding future effectively eliminates one im-
portant promise of crowdfunding: the democratization of investing.
191. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (2012).
192. Id. § 77(b)(a)(10).
193. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2014).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (making it unlawful to offer to sell or offer to buy a security unless a regis-
tration statement has been filed); 17 C.F.R. § 230.163(A)(a) (creating safe harbor for statements by
issuer that do not reference offering made 30 days or more before filing of the registration statement);
id. § 230.135(a) (permitting the issuer to reference an offering without mentioning the underwriter or
the price); id. § 230.169 (creating limited safe harbor for statements by issuer that are regular releases
of factual business information).
195. The draconian nature of the so-called "gun-jumping" IPO rules were softened somewhat in
2005 as part of certain IPO reforms. Currently, Rule 433 allows for the use of "free writing prospectus-
es" by issuers during the registration period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433. Non-reporting and unseasoned issu-
ers, however, may only use free writing prospectuses if accompanied or preceded by the most recent
preliminary prospectus. Id.
196. See Usha Rodrigues, In Search of Safe Harbor: Suggestions for the New Rule 506(c), 66
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 29,30 (2013).
197. IPOs have long been expensive and burdensome, but nevertheless remain a major step in the
life cycle of larger companies. Theories explaining the staying power of IPOs include venture capital
exit, founder diversification, liquidity, and increased capital raising power.
198. Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L.
REv. 281 (2014).
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VI. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF INVESTOR CROWDFUNDING
Unlike the euphoria surrounding equity crowdfunding prior to the
enactment of the JOBS Act, and now the SEC proposed rules, currently
the outlook for equity crowdfunding looks doubtful. Earlier concerns re-
lating to fraud still remain, but now proponents of crowdfunding despair
over the costly restrictions imposed on equity crowdfunding and portals.
In addition, with the lifting of the ban on general solicitation for Rule 506
private placements, issuers may engage in "accredited crowdfunding"'"
without a registered portal, under that exemption and not Section 4(6).
A. Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed Because Fraud Will Be Rampant
A nonzero percentage of projects on websites like Kickstarter never
deliver rewards or products to backers,2 0 generally for nonfraudulent
reasons. 201 A larger, but still small, percentage of member borrowers on
Prosper and Lending Club default on their crowdfunded loans.202 Similar-
ly, a substantial percentage of issuers that are crowdfunded will fail, with
funders losing up to their full investment. The level of risk associated
with investing in startup companies, which may be even greater than IPO
issuers, is substantial.203 In addition, fraud on a crowdfunding portal is
sure to happen, whether it is a full-fledged confidence scheme with a fake
project and no plans to use the money for anything except lining pock-
ets,20 or it is a legitimate project with issuers that make falsely glowing
199. See id. at 1.
200. See Mollick, Dynamics, supra note 90, at 13 (showing results that "the vast majority" of suc-
cessfully funded Kickstarter projects eventually deliver a project, but seventy-five percent are de-
layed).
201. In April 2014, however, the State of Washington filed a lawsuit under the Washington Con-
sumer Protection Act against Altius Management LLC and its president, Edward J. Polchlopek III, for
unfair and deceptive trade practices. Complaint at 4, Washington v. Altius Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-2-
12425 (Wash. Superior Ct. Apr. 30, 2014). According to the Complaint, Altius Management created a
Kickstarter project for "Asylum Playing Cards," which attracted $25,146 from 810 backers, more than
meeting its $15,000 goal. Id. at 2-5. Delivery of playing cards to backers was promised by December
2012. Id. at 5. As of April 2014, however, no backer had received anything and no information was
forthcoming. Id. The penalty for violating the Act is $2000 per thirty-one violations against residents
of Washington. Id. at 7. See also, Niraj Chokshi, The First State Lawsuit Over a Crowdfunding Project
is About a Deck of Cards, WASH. POST GovBEAT BLOG (May 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/govbeat/wpl2014/05/02/the-first-state-lawsuit-over-a-crowdfunding-project-is-about-a-deck-
of-cards/.
202. See Prosper Funding LLC, Registration Statement (Amendment No. 8 to Form S-1) 13 (Dec.
21, 2012) (disclosing that out of 34,042 loans that were made by Prosper between July 13, 2009 and
September 30, 2012, 2% were between one and thirty days late; 2.1% were over thirty days late; and
6.1% had defaulted).
203. See Bullard Testimony, supra note 170, at 24 ("Small business failures are not typically the
result of fraud. They are business failures that result from incompetence and/or inexperience. This
means that, no matter what disclosures are provided, sophistication tests are applied, or intermediary
rules are adopted, about half of crowdfunding investments in crowdfunded startups may be a total
loss.").
204. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 144 (detailing a scenario in which con artists could set up
online solicitations for "phantom" projects).
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statements about the business to attract funders.205 There is good reason
to think that phony crowdfunding solicitations on a legitimate internet
portal will attract more investors than face-to-face solicitations. More
importantly, "leaving town" with fools' money is easier when there is no
town.
On the other hand, the public Internet face of crowdfunding leads
some to believe that fraud will be ferreted about by the crowd and thus
both caught and deterred. 2 06 The transparency and centralized nature of
crowdfunding portals will make fraud harder rather than easier.2" Ac-
cording to congressional testimony, no fraud to date has been reported
by Prosper or U.K. crowdlending sites.208
Critics of crowdfunding were not comforted by the CROWDFUND
Act or the proposed regulations because of the paucity of provisions
aimed at combatting fraud. Section 4(6)(c) does, though, provide for lia-
bility for both issuers and the portal. Theoretically, the requirement that
retail equity crowdfunding take place on a registered portal subject to li-
ability will force the portal to take on a gatekeeping role similar to an
underwriter in both private placements and IPOs.2" This additional bur-
den on portals, which prior to the CROWDFUND Act seemed more like
passive sites like eBay or Craigslist, leads to other, more negative predic-
tions.
B. Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed Because Section 4(6) Is Too Costly
and Burdensome on Issuers and Portals
No one disagrees that the resulting crowdfunding exemption in Sec-
tion 4(6) will be burdensome on both issuers and portals.2 10 Project spon-
205. See Venkat Kuppuswamy & Barry L. Bayus, Crowdfunding Creative Ideas: The Dynamics of
Project Backers in Kickstarter 26 (Univ. Of N.C. Kenan-Flager Research Paper No. 2013-15, 2014),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2234765 (arguing that irrational herding behavior will in-
crease the chances for fraud in crowdfunding).
206. See Rowe Testimony, supra note 9, at 2 (comparing the review mechanism of eBay.com to
the potential of crowdfunders to exchange information about fraudsters).
207. See RocketHub Testimony, supra note 171, at 2 ("Every securities market and/or offering
has the potential for fraud, but crowdfunding structures help minimize that risk. Crowdfunding is
highly transparent, and there is substantial feedback from other community participants. The
crowd helps police players and keeps them honest. Portals provide a clear and central location for
communication by potential investors to analyze and share their views on offerings. The web
based structure also allows portals and regulators to provide risk disclosure and investor educa-
tion. In addition, we expect portal operators will undertake a gatekeeping role in authenticating
issuer identity and requiring minimum standards for issuers.").
208. See id.
209. Various commenters suggested that portals would be in the best position to vet crowdfund-
ing issuers for fraud, though they may not have encouraged both registration and liability. See Rowe
Testimony, supra note 9, at 3 (suggesting that portals compete for reputation in vetting enterprises but
not be burdened with excessive liability); Lynn Testimony, supra note 142, at 4 (recommending that
portals have some "stamp of approval" but not be overburdened with regulation so as to make run-
ning a portal uneconomic).
210. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1605-06 ("[T]his will not turn out to be par-
ticularly fertile ground for start-up capital-raising activity; the regulatory costs are likely to take too
much of the small amounts of money that can be raised even if portals absorb some of the anticipated
costs.").
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sors will have to incorporate, create entity tax returns and financial
statements, and have those financial statements audited if the target
amount is greater than $500,000.211 The economies of scale will not be
there for most issuers.2 12 In addition, portals will not be passive bulletin
boards but will be required to do due diligence and face liability for
fraudulent misstatements and omissions from crowdfunding issuers. To
compensate for this type of liability, portals will have to charge crowd-
funders higher fees for listing, increasing costs for issuers. Given the
small size of the issues, issuers may not be willing to pay exorbitant list-
ing fees. In addition, portals would necessarily have to limit the number
of offerors. In 2012, 18,109 projects on Kickstarter were successful, sug-
gesting approximately 36,000 projects were offered in that year alone. 213
To do any type of due diligence, a site as large as Kickstarter would nec-
essarily have a staff of hundreds.
In addition, portals are tasked with ensuring the investors do not
exceed aggregate investing limits in a twelve-month period for all Section
4(6) offerings participated in by a single investor. In 2013, Kickstarter
boasted that over three million individuals backed successful projects. 214
For a portal to be responsible for even minimum certification of over
three million individuals a year, from 214 countries and territories, is al-
most inconceivable. 215
Though few alternatives exist to create economies of scale for issu-
ers, established investment banks could create retail crowdfunding por-
tals within their existing businesses. At first, investment banks explored
creating online auction IPO platforms, but may have realized that offer-
ing that service would reduce demand for their more lucrative book-
building IPO services. Investment banks still might see crowdfunding as
a way to establish relationships with promising issuers, who may later
want private placement or IPO services. If seen this way, a crowdfunding
portal might be a loss leader or might be somewhat subsidized by other
financial services. This would hold true, though, only if the financial firms
211. The hierarchy of financial disclosure found in Section 4A(b)(1)(D) may have (at least) two
unintended consequences. First, crowdfunding issuers may cluster at the $500,000 target and below,
opting out of the additional costs for audited financials at the risk of not raising sufficient capital. See
Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding's Curious Conundrum, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPEN.
Bus. L. J. 373, 375 (2012). Second, issuers may strategically set low targets because audited financials
are not needed if the actual amount raised is above $500,000 and greater than the lower target. Id. In
addition, two crowdfunding offerings twelve months apart for $500,000 would not trigger the need for
audited statements. Id.
212. See Robb Mandelbaum, What the Proposed Crowdfunding Rules Could Cost Businesses,
N.Y. TIMES YOU'RE THE Boss BLOG (Nov. 14, 2013, 7:00AM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/
14/what-the-proposed-crowdfunding-rules-could-cost-businesses/?_php=true&_type=blogs&-r=0 (cal-
culating that the combined costs for crowdfunding exceed the cost of a small business owner using a
credit card).
213. The Best of 2012, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.comlyear/2012?ref=footer#overall
-pledged (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
214. 2013: The Year in Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.comlyear/2013/?ref
=footer#1-people-dollars (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
215. See PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications 1987) ("You keep using that word. I do not
think it means what you think it means.").
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believed that promising young companies were launching retail equity
crowdfunded offerings.
C. Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed Because It Will Be a Market of
Lemons
Perhaps because of the outsized costs, or the availability of other
exemptions discussed below, commentators have suggested that promis-
ing companies may steer clear of crowdfunding.216 Then, the landscape
would be filled with companies that were not able to secure other early-
stage funding.217 The end result would be that crowdfunding would be a
signal, whether true or not,2 18 of poor quality. Though some high quality
projects might choose to have a crowdfunding offering for various rea-
sons, retail investors might be frightened away, unable to distinguish be-
tween good and bad offerings. 2 19 In addition, if there is fraud, or if there
is a sense that fraud is prevalent, then even good offerings will be tainted
by the possibility of fraud.
If the retail equity crowdfunding landscape does begin to resemble a
market for lemons, then issuers could take steps to signal quality. Third-
party certification might be one avenue, but such certification would be
costly. For example, quality issuers might choose to provide audited fi-
nancials regardless of target capital raise amounts. 22 0 Some have suggest-
ed that angel investors or VC firms might tell prospects to try a crowd-
funding offering to "test the waters." 2 21 Perhaps those third parties could
make a token investment or some other commitment so that crowdfund-
ing issuers could present themselves as having funding from a brand-
name VC firm.
216. See The JOBS Act: Importance of Prompt Implementation for Entrepreneurs, Capital For-
mation, and Job Creation. Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs., & Bailouts of
Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform & the Subcomm. on Capital
Mkts. & Gov't Sponsored Enter. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. 112th Cong. 2 (Sept. 13, 2012) (state-
ment of Naval Ravikant, CEO, AngelList) (predicting that if crowdfunding regulations are too restric-
tive, then startups who can get funding elsewhere will, leaving the crowdfunding space for the "des-
perate").
217. See Dorff, supra note 156, at 26 (hypothesizing that crowdfunding will be for companies that
can't get angel financing and will suffer from not getting the benefits angels provide).
218. Id. at 33 ("Having fewer quality prospects to choose from will only increase the already high
odds that crowdfunders will lose their investments.").
219. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanisms, 84 Q. J. EcoN. 488,489 (1970) (describing this phenomenon using the used car market as
an example).
220. See Proposed Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 14, at 66,554 (Instruction 10) (allowing
issuers to provide audited financial statements even if the aggregate amount raised is less than
$500,000).
221. See Claire Ingram et al., Solving the Puzzle of Crowdfunding: Where Technological Af-
fordances and Institutional Entrepreneurship Collide 1, 7 (Social Science Research Network, Working
Paper 2285426, 2013), available at http://www.ssrn.comlabstract=2285426.
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D. Retail Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed Because Issuers Will Choose
Accredited Equity Crowdfunding under New Rule 506
Commentators predict that accredited crowdfunding under Rule
506 will eclipse retail crowdfunding and make the latter merely a back-up
plan for hard-to-fund issuers.2 2 2 Websites already exist among angel in-
vestors that can be expanded to add general solicitation to other accred-
ited investor prospects, such as AngelList223, CircleUp, 2 24 Portfolia ,225
FundersClub, 2 6 MicroVentures,m7 and Fundrise,m and others are sure to
follow. Unlike retail crowdfunding under Section 4(6), portals will not
need to meet the requirements of Section 4A(a),2 29 and issuers will not
have to provide mandatory disclosure under Section 4A(b). Finally, issu-
ers can raise more than $1 million, and do not have to set or meet a tar-
get amount as in Section 4A(a)(7).
E. Retail Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed Because Funders Will Not
Participate in Future Profits
One stated criticism of crowdfunding is that crowdfunded firms will
not be able to obtain later financing through traditional channels. Then,
funders will not have an exit mechanism because there will be no IPO or
acquisition. Inability to raise later capital could be a result of crowdfund-
ing stigma2 1 or unwillingness of VC firms to invest in a firm with thou-
sands of shareholders. 22
An opposite criticism of crowdfunding is that if there is later financ-
ing, crowdfunders will not participate in that potential upside. New
rounds of financing will almost certainly dilute crowdfunders,233 with only
222. See Parsont, supra note 199, at 5 (claiming "that accredited crowdfunding is likely to domi-
nate and, depending on SEC action, could render retail crowdfunding superfluous or a market for
lemons").
223. ANGELLIST, http://angel.co (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
224. CIRCLEUP, http://circleup.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
225. PORTFOLIA, http://portfolia.com (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
226. FUNDERS CLUB, http://www.fundersclub.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
227. MICROVENTURES, http://www.microventures.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
228. FUND RISE, http://www.fundrise.com (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
229. These portals may have to register as broker-dealers, however, unless they comply with Sec-
tion 4(b) of the Securities Act, which requires the platform to receive no compensation. Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(b)(1) (2012). AngelList currently displays a 2012 legal opinion from K&L
Gates on its site to the effect that it is exempt from broker-dealer registration under Section 4(b), add-
ed by the JOBS Act. See Letter from K&L Gates to AngelList (Aug. 30, 2012) available at https:
//angel.coldocuments/AngelList%20Legal%200pinion%20-%2Aug%2030%202012.pdf.
230. See id. §77d-1 (requiring portals and brokers to "ensure that all offering proceeds are only
provided to the issuer when the aggregate capital raised from all investors is equal to or greater than a
target offering amount").
231. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 144, at 3.
232. The CROWDFUND Act allows crowdfunding issuers to avoid the two thousand shareholder
rule (previously the five hundred shareholder rule) that triggers registration under the Securities Act.
See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Security Regulation
After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 354 (2013). VC firms may be unexcited about the "equity over-
hang."
233. See Lynn Testimony, supra note 142, at 5 (suggesting a standard subscription agreement re-
quired by portals to ensure that crowdfunders are not diluted or otherwise denied participation in fu-
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later investors enjoying any profits from an exit event. Alternatively,
venture finance companies will repurchase crowdfunded securities dur-
ing a later round of financing, which may occur before those shares have
appreciated.?
An assumption behind this argument is that equity crowdfunders
are primarily interested in outsized returns. So, the argument goes, when
crowdfunders are bought out by venture capital funds a year or two be-
fore a big IPO or acquisition, and they learn of the great returns that
they missed, the crowd will abandon crowdfunding. Crowdfunders, how-
ever, may have different motivations than traditional angel investors and
IPO investors. For example, many of the projects funded on Kickstarter
have commercial value, such as books, documentaries, movies, and mu-
sic. Funders understand that should these projects become blockbusters
or bestsellers that they will receive merely what they were promised: a
DVD, an advance copy, a liner note. This reality does not seem to slow
down donor crowdfunding.
F. Retail Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed Because the Financial
Services Industry Will Avoid Crowdfunded Startups
In a perfect world, a crowdfunded offering would become part of
the life cycle of a startup company: friends and family funding, crowd-
funding, angel investing, venture capital investing, initial public offering.
However, equity crowdfunding may not supplant venture capital invest-
ing for two of the same reasons that auction IPOs did not threaten the
bookbuilding IPO.
First, just as underwriters add value to IPOs by creating demand for
the offering among their demand networks, venture capital firms bring
more than financial capital to founders. Venture capital firms bring man-
agerial expertise, networks, and industry knowledge that the crowd may
not be able to provide. Some debate exists as to what nonmonetary bene-
fits can be extracted from the crowd. One theory is that equity crowd-
funding markets could flourish as information markets, providing costly
and important information to issuers. Particularly for projects that are
consumer products, the crowd could be a very helpful test market. Retail
investors are consumers and may have as a group as much or more mar-
ket expertise than a VC firm. Crowdfunders who flock to a particular
consumer product project are contributing information that they see the
product as valuable and that they predict that others will also. Crowd-
ture upside); John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the CROWDFUND Act: Zuckerberg,
Saverin, and Venture Capital's Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583 (2013) (sug-
gesting that contractual rights could protect crowdfunders against future dilution).
234. See Angel Testimony, supra note 13, at 12 (explaining that the exit for the crowdfunder will
be either another round of financing or an acquisition event).
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funding issuers could find other ways to fine-tune that contribution to
give feedback on price and other aspects of the product. 5
Another pro-crowdfunding theory is that crowdfunders act as evan-
gelists in ways that a VC firm cannot. One thousand crowdfunders will
be able to provide word of mouth advertising through social networks to
more consumers than one VC firm.
A related criticism is that one powerful value that VC firms bring is
selection ability. VC-funded firms are able to signal to the market at IPO
that they have great potential due to the sorting expertise of VC firms.
The accuracy of VC firms' selection ability, however, has been the sub-
ject of debate2 3 6 and many academic studies.2 37 The counterpoint to this
argument is obvious: the crowd may be able to select promising projects
with as much expertise, given VC firms' low success rate. As commenta-
tors point out, VCs are able to profit in the long term through diversifica-
tion across many different investments. Crowdfunders are not able to do
that given the aggregate limits under Section 4(6).238
Second, equity crowdfunding may fail just as the online auction IPO
failed because a crowdfunded issuer may find that a Section 4(6) offering
forecloses other traditional avenues of early stage funding. One concern
is that crowdfunding would carry a stigma and send a signal that the pro-
ject could not successfully get funded elsewhere. In the auction IPO, tra-
ditional Wall Street players may shun auction issuers by financial firms
not providing analyst coverage and by institutional investors not purchas-
ing equity shares. These two actions can depress the issuer's stock and
cause the issuer to lose value. If time proves that crowdfunded issuers are
not able to tap into traditional sources of funding later, then crowdfund-
ing will not prosper. First, issuers will not be able to scale up if they can
only raise $1 million every twelve months in crowdfunding and not get
larger infusions from private equity firms. Second, retail investors in for-
profit companies eventually want a return on their investment, which
traditionally comes through some sort of exit mechanism, either an ac-
quisition by another firm or an IPO. 23 9 If the next few years do not have
235. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1606 (regretting that nothing in the
CROWDFUND Act mandated or provided for information gathering from crowdfunders). In the
proposed regulations, however, certain safe harbors indicate that the SEC envisions allowing, but not
mandating, issuers to have interaction via the portal with crowdfunders during the offering. See Pro-
posed Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 14, at 66,445.
236. See Davidoff, Trepidation, supra note 172 (stating that forty percent of VC investments fail,
forty percent break even, and twenty percent have a "decent to high return"); Dorff, supra note 156, at
20 (stating that seventy-five percent of positive returns to angel investors come from ten percent of
projects, so on average, crowdfunding will be a losing proposition).
237. See generally Mollick, Selection, supra note 35 (reviewing the economics literature on VC
selection ability).
238. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012) (requiring portals and brokers to
"make such efforts as the Commission determines appropriate, by rule, to ensure that no investor in a
12-month period has purchased securities offered pursuant to section 4(6) that, in the aggregate, from
all issuers, exceed the investment limits set forth in section 4(6)(B)").
239. See Gerrit K.C. Ahlers et al., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding (Social Sciences Research
Network, Working Paper No. 2161587, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161587 (analyzing
equity crowdfunding projects from non-U.S. platforms and concluding that "start-ups that signal their
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stories of crowdfunded issuers being acquired at a profit or launching
IPOs, then investor demand for crowdfunding may dwindle.
Finally, should accredited crowdfunding flourish under Rule 506,
this success would not be a win for proponents of retail crowdfunding.
One of the grand promises of equity crowdfunding was that it would de-
mocratize early stage investing. Accredited crowdfunding by definition
does not accomplish that goal.
VII. EQUITY CROWDFUNDING FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
Given the uncertainties about equity crowdfunding-cost, stigma,
dilution, signaling-the benefits of crowdfunding for most for-profit
companies seem small, if not negative. Yet, current crowdfunding trends
could inform which types of companies will continue to flourish by rais-
ing funds on the Internet. Prior to the passage of the crowdfunding regu-
lations, many commercial projects enjoyed the fruits of online crowd-
funding even thought they could not legally offer equity participations in
a for-profit enterprise with plenty of future growth. Currently, charitable,
altruistic, and artistic crowdfunding dominates a large crowdfunding
space, not would-be equity issuances. Of the tens of thousands of pro-
jects funded through portals in the United States today, most of them are
projects that could be commercial but are prosocial ventures funded by
mere donations. According to Kickstarter, projects with the highest suc-
cess rates are "Dance," "Theater," and "Music." 240 In fact, these are the
only projects with success rates over fifty percent. The next two are
"Comics" and "Art." 2 4 1 By volume, the greatest number of successful
projects are in the following categories: "Music," "Film & Video," "Art,"
"Publishing," and "Theater." 2 4 2 These projects are generally projects that
could provide profits, though small profits on average, for the entrepre-
neur who sells the song, album, film, photograph, painting, book, or tick-
ets to a live performance. Funders, though, are quite willing to give mon-
ey without expectation of return or even a tax deduction. Funders are
promised token gifts, which range from small units of the artists' work to
acknowledgements to "eternal gratitude."2 43 Funders seem to be attract-
ed to these projects because of the social good that art, and even comics
and video games, create for the world at large. Even though the creator
is retaining the proceeds and profits, if any, funders seem inclined to in-
vest, even without an expected return.
intention to seek an exit by either IPO or a trade sale are more likely to attract investors than those
planning to use other forms of exit").
240. See Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=footer (last visited Feb.
14,2013) (showing the success rate for music as 55.18%; theater as 64.34%; and dance as 70.37%).
241. See id. (showing the success rate for comics as 49.32% and art as 47.91%).
242. See id. (reporting 15,049 successful music projects; 13,132 film and video projects; 5626 art
projects; 5139 publishing projects, and 3565 theater projects).
243. Pattern Store by Indianapolis Fashion Collective, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/
projects/181687873/pattern-store/comments?cursor=0&direction=as (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
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This remains true for even more commercial projects. Some pro-
jects, like the now famous Pebble watch2" and Veronica Mars Movie, 2 45
are arguably commercial projects with limited prosocial aspects for which
a large return may be available. Some funders may truly be interested in
contributing only with a commitment to receive the product early in re-
turn, but they are definitely taking a risk that the product will not be
produced at all. In the United States particularly, investors may merely
be attracted by a great idea and may use small amounts of money as
votes for supporting an environment conducive to both this great idea
and more great ideas. Some of the entrepreneurs are not even the "little
guy," but the idea of giving even known funders, like Zach Braff and
James Franco, the freedom and creative space to work attracts money
from the crowd.2 4 6
Moreover, Kiva backers fund six thousand loans a week, 24 7 without
any expectation of interest as compensation for the use of that money
and no recourse should the principal not be repaid. In fact, no-interest
lenders do not receive a tax deduction on either the principal or the fore-
gone interest.2" In addition, many of those lenders continually reloan
principal that has been repaid.2"9 Since its launch in 2005, Kiva has funded
over $1.3 million from funds loaned free from strangers who support the
cause of microfinance. 2 5 0
Given the appetite of funders for substantively attractive projects
that offer little or no return, the crowdfunding winners following the pas-
sage of Section 4(2) seems to be in the niche of social enterprise: for-
profit entities involved in prosocial projects. These low-profit projects
with strong corporate missions could legally attract equity crowdfunding
from the general public, who may not be concerned with high returns, ex-
244. Fell, supra note 89.
245. Sarah Rappaport, Kickstarter Funding Brings 'Veronica Mars' Movie to Life, CNBC (Mar.
12,2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/1014867#.
246. Kickstarter boasts many feature films that have been crowdfunded, claiming ten percent of
films at Sundance in 2013 were crowdfunded. Courtney Garcia, Kickstarter Co-Founder Defends Spike
Lee and His New Model for Moviemaking, THE GRIO (Aug. 12, 2013), http://thegrio.com/
2013/08/12/kickstarter-founder-defends-spike-lee-and-his-new-model-for-moviemaking/. These films
compete with films that are investor-funded. Kickstarter backers have backed movie projects that did
not attract investor funding, such as the Veronica Mars movie and Zach Braff's movie, Wish I Was
Here. See supra note 84. James Franco, after criticizing Braff for using Kickstarter, later used Indie-
gogo to crowdfund a movie adaptation of a book of stories he authored, entitled Palo Alto Stories. His
campaign, though, fell short of his five hundred thousand dollar funding goal. See Palo Alto Stories by
James Franco, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/projects/palo-alto-stories-by-james-franco (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014). Screenwriter Charlie Kaufman, whose movies Adaptation and Synecdoche, New
York were more critical than commercial successes, launched a successful campaign to crowdfund an
animated movie, Anomalisa. See Anita Hamilton, 5 Buzziest Movies to Get Crowdfunded, TIME (Apr.
25, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/04/25/5-buzziest-movies-to-get-crowdfunded/.
Crowdfunders, however, may change their minds about their favorite misunderstood artists should
these highly anticipated crowdfunded movies have successful box office returns.
247. See Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.orglabout/stats (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
248. See Lawsky, supra note 91, at 1534.
249. See How Kiva Works, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/how (last visited Oct. 20, 2014)
(numbering the four steps lenders take as (1) "Make a Loan;" (2) "Get Updates;" (3) "Get Paid
Back;" and (4) "Repeat").
250. Statistics, KIVA.ORG, http://www.kiva.orglabout/stats (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
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it strategies, or late round dilution. In addition, social entrepreneurs may
not be concerned with attracting later rounds of funding from VC firms,
where the prospect of mission drift looms large. 251 In fact, crowdfunding
may create branding opportunities for prosocial ventures.
For for-profit corporations that attempt to serve a "double line,"
outside funding from private sources or the public at large threaten to
erode an ethos inconsistent with maximizing shareholder value. Though
many regulatory proposals have attempted to carve out space for social
enterprise through corporate governance, corporate finance may offer
more potential. New organizational forms such as the benefit corporation
and low-profit limited liability companies seek to protect shareholders
from the corporation that is tempted (perhaps by different shareholders)
to drift away from its mission.25 Danger may be drawn from both con-
centrated owners, such as venture capital funds and angel investors, and
the general public who are merely looking for a positive return. Crowd-
funding may serve to insulate the corporation from shareholders who do
not believe in the mission and are looking for either high returns or a liq-
uid investment.
Finally, crowdfunding might be less of a stigma for a social enter-
prise, which might use its populist quality for branding purposes. In addi-
tion, social enterprise firms may not wish to have later rounds of funding
and an eventual IPO, which might be forestalled by a crowdfunding of-
fering.
Websites already exist to crowdfund nonprofit social entrepreneur-
ship, like Razoo2 53 and StartSomeGood25 4 and other sites are poised to
launch equity crowdfunding in social enterprises, like Impact Trader.255
Furthermore, though the increased liability and obligations imposed on
portals by Section 4A may create disincentives for portals to be estab-
lished and operate, not-for-profit portals could be created to support so-
cial entrepreneurship.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The CROWDFUND Act and its enabling regulation were anxiously
awaited by a market eager to raise funds and invest in crowdfunded en-
terprises. As it turned out, the long overdue exemption for securities reg-
istration seems more likely to choke out quality equity crowdfunding
than support it. Not only do the requirements of Section 4(6) burden is-
suers and portal intermediaries with costly disclosure and certification
251. See generally PHIL VISCHER, ME, MYSELF AND BOB: A TRUE STORY ABOUT DREAMS, GOD,
AND TALKING VEGETABLES (2006) (detailing the rise and fall of Big Idea Productions, and how the
creator of Veggie Tales lost creative control of the faith-based company after accepting outside fund-
ing and the management changes that came with it, leading to the bankruptcy of that company).
252. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681,689-
91(2013).
253. RAZOO, www.razoo.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
254. STARTSOMEGOOD, www.startsomegood.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
255. IMPACT TRADER, www.impacttrader.com (last visited Oct. 20,2014).
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requirements, but it also subjects them to antifraud provisions of Section
12 and 17.256 Due to the possibility of fraud, the crowdfunding market
may become a "market of lemons" for issuers unable to obtain other ear-
ly-stage financing. In addition, liberalization of other registration exemp-
tions will channel quality projects from "retail crowdfunding" under Sec-
tion 4(6) to "accredited crowdfunding" under Rule 506 of Regulation D.
Though crowdfunding has the promise of disintermediating early-
stage financing and democratizing both access to capital and access to in-
vestment opportunities, a shift from retail crowdfunding to accredited
crowdfunding will not fulfill that promise. Just as democratic online auc-
tion IPOs did not supplant traditional bookbuilding IPOs, crowdfunding
may not survive a backlash from angel investors and VC firms.
Even so, social entrepreneurs may benefit from crowdfunding. Be-
cause low-profit social entrepreneurs really are looking for a Kickstarter-
plus offering, not a Merrill-minus offering, they can harness the willing-
ness of the crowd to fund prosocial and artistic endeavors with little ex-
pectation of return or a tax deduction. This type of corporate finance
revolution may prove more lasting than corporate governance experi-
ments such as benefit corporations.
256. Heminway & Hoffman, Peril, supra note 132, at 908.
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